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Performing Diplomatic Relations: Music and
East German Foreign Policy in the Middle East
during the Late 1960s
ELAINE KELLY
Introduction: A Pericentric Perspective on Music Diplomacy
On the afternoon of January 6, 1967, the national airline of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), Interflug, made its first ever landing in Leba-
non. On board the flight were the conductor Heinz Bongartz and the mem-
bers of the Dresdner Philharmonie, who were embarking on the first tour to
theMiddle East by an East German orchestra. The musicians were greeted at
the airport in Beirut by a reception committee that included members of the
Lebanese press, and later that evening they played to a sold-out house at the
city’s Piccadilly Theatre. They departed for Egypt the following day, and on
January 8 performed the first of three concerts at the Cairo Opera House.
Although attendance at this event was poorer, audience numbers increased
over the course of the orchestra’s stay in Egypt, and when the tour, which in-
cluded a concert in Alexandria, ended on January 13, it was hailed in the GDR
as an unmitigated success. A jubilant welcome from party officials and the East
German press awaited the orchestra on its return to Dresden airport.1
This tour was not an isolated event. It was a key moment in the short-lived
but intense cultural program that the GDR directed at the Middle East in the
late 1960s in the hopes of expediting diplomatic relations with the Arab na-
tions. Targeting Egypt in particular but also Lebanon and Syria, the GDR’s
ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of
Thanks are due to Anthony Gorman for being a willing sounding board on Egypt, and to
the Journal’s anonymous reviewers for their extremely sharp insights. Translations from Ger-
man and French are my own; those from Arabic are by Mikko Lehikoinen, who also assisted
with the location of Arabic sources. The article uses the simplified International Journal of Mid-
dle East Studies system for the transliteration of Arabic.
1. For details of the tour, see “Konzertreise in der Orient: Unsere Musikrezensentin Ilse
Löwe sprach mit der Potsdamer Sängerin Adele Stolte über ihre Eindrücke im Libanon und
in der VAR,”Märkische Volksstimme Potsdam, January 21, 1967, and Dieter Härtwig, “Reise
der Dresdner Philharmonie: Tagebuchnotizen aus der VAR und der Republik Libanon von
Dr. Dieter Härtwig,” Wir, February 3, 1967, 5.
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Germany, SED) sent an array of musical acts on official tours to the region.
These included variety ensembles, popular singers such as Chris Doerk, Frank
Schöbel, Rosemarie Ambé, and Armin Mueller-Stahl, jazz musicians such as
Fips Fleischer and AlfonsWonneberg and their bands, and the artistic wing of
the East German army, the Erich-Weinert-Ensemble. GDR officials assigned
pride of place toWestern art music, making copious efforts to deploy “expert”
East German performers and music teachers to shape musical life in Cairo and
Damascus. Recordings and scores of East German compositions were sent to
Cairo to be broadcast on national radio and performed by the Cairo Sympho-
ny Orchestra, while prominent figures in the cultural life of Egypt and Leba-
non were invited on all-expenses-paid trips to the GDR to experience East
Germanmusical life firsthand. A small number of Arab musicians were invited
to perform in the GDR, and numerous East Germanmusicians traveled to the
Middle East. Most significant of all were the large-scale classical ensembles
that traveled in quick succession to the region. Following in the wake of
the Dresdner Philharmonie’s tour of January 1967 came the Rundfunk-
Sinfonieorchester Leipzig (RSO Leipzig), which performed concerts in
Damascus and Cairo and at the Baalbeck Festival in Lebanon in August
1967. The Deutsche Staatsoper also gave a series of performances in Cairo as
part of the city’s millennial celebrations inMarch 1969, and the Gewandhaus-
orchester featured at the Baalbeck Festival in August 1969. The Kammer-
orchester des Berliner Rundfunks gave concerts in Beirut, Cyprus, and Cairo
in November 1970, and, lastly, the Gewandhaus’s BachOrchester played two
concerts in Lebanon in December 1971, the final leg of a tour that had taken
in Manila, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Mumbai.
This brief musical incursion offers a rich site of study for what Tony Smith
has termed a “pericentric” approach to the Cold War.2 There has been a
proliferation of research on the topic of Cold War music diplomacy in recent
years. The majority of this has been conceived in terms of a Washington-
Moscow power axis: the focus is on the activities of the superpowers, schol-
ars seeking to demonstrate how the United States and the USSR used music
either against each other or to exert influence on a global scale.3 Some of this
work takes account of the perspectives of what are generally termed periph-
ery states—that is, states that were implicated in the Cold War but located at
the peripheries of power, either in Europe or in the global south. Periphery
states have, however, generally only been examined in terms of their interac-
tions with the superpowers.4
2. Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine.”
3. See, for example, Ansari, Sound of a Superpower; Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad; Crist, “Jazz as
Democracy?”; Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World; and Carr, “Diplomatic Notes.”
4. See Fosler-Lussier,Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, which is particularly illumi-
nating in the extent to which it focuses on the reception of theUnited States’ diplomatic endeav-
ors in postcolonial countries, and Fairclough, “Détente to ColdWar.”One notable exception to
the center-periphery paradigm is Jakelski,Making New Music.
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In the wider field of Cold War studies, there has been a growing impetus
to refocus the geopolitical orientation of the ColdWar away from this center-
periphery model. As David C. Engermann observes of the USSR, the view
that “Moscow directed all of its allies’ actions in the Cold War is no longer
sustainable.”5 Recent scholarship makes clear that periphery states played an
active role in the global Cold War. Nonaligned states often exerted consider-
able agency in their dealings with the superpowers, adopting a stance of “pos-
itive neutralism” that essentially involved playing one superpower off against
the other.6 Similarly, in their dealings with nonaligned states, Eastern Euro-
pean countries and Soviet allies such as Cuba demonstrated high levels of au-
tonomy. They established international relationships, instigated trade deals
and intervened in political conflicts of their own volition, and frequently pur-
sued agendas that served their own rather than Soviet interests.7 A pericentric
conceptualization of the Cold War complicates established narratives of the
period significantly. For one thing, as Engerman points out, the “Cold”War
was far from cold for the many regions who were engaged at some point or
other in military conflicts with global resonances.8 The geopolitical reorien-
tation necessitated by a focus on periphery states also reveals the multiplicity
of ideologies and agendas that were actually at play. Relations between the
GDR and the Arab nations at the center of this article, for example, unfolded
against escalating Arab-Israeli tensions and the standoff between the GDR
and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and were shaped more by dis-
courses of nationalism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-Zionism
than by any binary opposition of Marxist-Leninism and capitalist democracy.
East German foreign policy was dominated in the 1950s and 1960s by
the SED’s quest to assert the GDR’s legitimacy. Founded in 1949, the state
did not achieve sovereignty until 1955, when the USSR ceded any plans it
had had for a united Germany and signed the Treaty on Relations between
the USSR and the GDR. This granted the GDR a level of autonomy on a
5. Engerman, “Second World’s Third World,” 184.
6. On the concept of positive neutralism, see Sayegh, “Anatomy of Neutralism,” 70. For
reconsiderations of the balance of power between the superpowers and nonaligned states, see
Engerman, Price of Aid; Boden, “Cold War Economics”; and Matusevich, No Easy Row.
7. See, for example, Mazurek, “Polish Economists in Nehru’s India”; Dragostinova,
“‘Natural Ally’”; Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in Africa; and Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions.
It is worth providing some context at this point for the geopolitical terminologies used in this
article. The term “third world,” which was coined by the French scholar Alfred Sauvy in
1952, has long been contested. Equally, the terms “developing countries” and “developing
world” are problematic in the extent to which they privilege the “developed”West; the World
Bank notably dropped the classification “developing country” in 2016. I opt instead for the
terms “postcolonial” and, where appropriate, “nonaligned.” The nonaligned movement,
which originated in 1956 and was formalized in Belgrade in 1961, consisted of mostly post-
colonial states who sought to assert their independence from and navigate a third way to the
major power blocs of the USSR, the United States, and China.
8. Engerman, “Second World’s Third World,” 183.
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par with neighboring People’s Republics. It did not, however, enhance its
international standing; quite the opposite in fact. The FRG refused to ac-
knowledge a second German state, and responded by issuing the Hallstein
Doctrine, which stipulated that all countries that had diplomatic relations
with West Germany do likewise. This isolationist tactic was successful: West-
ern states shunned the GDR on the grounds that the FRG was a Cold War
ally, while many nonaligned countries did the same for fear of being seen to
side with the USSR and thus risk losing the often substantial development
aid they received from the West.9 As a result, beyond the realm of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc, the GDR found itself out in the cold. This pariah status
was a significant affront to the dignity of the SED. More practically, as Wil-
liam Glenn Gray observes, it “placed substantial barriers on the GDR’s free-
dom to maneuver.”10 It impeded the state’s ability to conduct trade deals
abroad; it precluded it from entry to bodies such as the United Nations; it
resulted in external restrictions on foreign travel for GDR citizens (in addi-
tion to the internal controls implemented by the SED); and it undermined
the SED’s uphill struggle to convince citizens at home of the validity of the
East German state. Consequently, until the early 1970s, when the FRG rel-
ented its hard-line stance, the SED’s foreign policy focused exhaustively on
the issue of international recognition.
With conventional channels of international engagement severely restrict-
ed, many of the foreign-policy strategies adopted by the GDR in the late
1950s and 1960s focused on diplomatic soft power, mobilizing elite artists
and athletes as de facto ambassadors.11 The SED intended its soft power ac-
tivities to present the GDR in a positive light and thus as a legitimate player
on the world stage, and to negate the Federal Republic’s claims to represent
the entire German nation. It also hoped to facilitate relationships with non-
aligned states, by supporting them in the construction of their own national
cultures and by standing in solidarity with them through acts of cultural di-
plomacy against imperialist oppression.12 Uniting all of these aims was the
drive to counter the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing the GDR in the eyes
of the world as an explicitly German rather than Soviet state. In musical
terms, this involved asserting the GDR’s ownership of Germany’s rich cul-
tural heritage. The Ministry for Culture declared in 1964 that state-directed
cultural diplomacy should endeavor to “spread the truth abroad that the
9. See Winrow, Foreign Policy of the GDR, 43, and Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 227.
10. Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 223.
11. See, for example, Barnett, “Politics of an International Reputation”; Smith, “Brecht,
the Berliner Ensemble”; and Yaeger, “Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra.”
12. These aims were set out explicitly by the Ministry for Culture in 1964. See Bundes-
archiv (hereafter BArch) DR 1/8651, “Vorlage für den Beirat für Auslandsinformation bei der
Agitationskommission des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei
Deutschlands über die Ausnutzung der kulturellen Potenzen der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik in der Auslandsinformation,” August 21, 1964, 1–2.
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GDR is the true protector and champion of the great cultural heritage of the
German nation.”13
The GDR was fortunate in housing within its borders some of Germany’s
oldest orchestras and opera companies, including the Staatskapelle Dresden,
the Gewandhausorchester Leipzig, and the Deutsche Staatsoper and its part-
nering Staatskapelle Berlin. The majority of these ensembles had resumed
foreign tours of their own accord after the Second World War, and by the
mid-1950s included Western venues in their annual performing schedules as
a matter of course. Initially, in stark contrast to the approach taken by the
USSR, political oversight of these tours was light-touch.14 Ensembles fre-
quently negotiated their own engagements, and as long as concert tours
broke even and conductors were not deemed to be flaunting their indepen-
dence, the Staatliche Kommission für Kunstangelegenheiten (State Commis-
sion for Artistic Affairs) and later the Ministry for Culture functioned largely
as validating rather than prescriptive bodies.15 As the GDR’s governing struc-
tures matured over the course of the 1950s, the SED began to exert more
control over foreign tours and to exploit their diplomatic potential. At first, it
concentrated its efforts on Western Europe and on Japan, where there was a
significant appetite for Western art music.16 In the mid-1960s, however, it ex-
tended its remit to the nonaligned states and to the Middle East in particular.
The SED had long had its sights set on the Middle East. The strong Soviet
presence in the region boded well for the GDR’s prospects, and the SED cam-
paigned throughout the 1950s and 1960s to establish East rather than West
Germany as the natural ally of the Arab nations, appealing to shared revolu-
tionary and anti-imperialist proclivities. At first, music diplomacy featured only
minimally in this strategy. The Erben String Quartet, which comprised mem-
bers of the Deutsche Staatsoper, gave concerts in Egypt and Syria in 1958,17
and in 1959 the East German Ministry for Culture sent conductor Udo Nis-
sen, pianist Siegfried Rapp, and singer Ruth Glowa-Burkhardt to perform two
concerts with the Cairo Symphony Orchestra to draw attention in Egypt to
the tenth anniversary of the GDR.18 East German artists continued to perform
13. Ibid., 1: “im Ausland die Wahrheit zu verbreiten, daß die DDR der wahre Hüter und
Sachwalter des großen kulturellen Erbes der deutschen Nation ist.”
14. For a comparison, see Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad.
15. The interactions between the Dresdner Philharmonie and government officials sur-
rounding the orchestra’s foreign tours in the early 1950s as documented in BArch DR 1/180
and BArch DR 1/6189 are particularly illuminating in this regard.
16. On the demand for Western art music in Japan, see Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s
Cold War Diplomacy, 51–56.
17. See the archive of theMinisterium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Politisches
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (hereafter MfAA), A 12235, for correspondence between
the GDR Ministry for Culture and the GDR trade mission in Cairo regarding the tour.
18. See MfAA A 12238, Alfred Marter (attaché), “Einschätzung des politischen und künst-
lerischen Erfolges des Auftretens von Künstlern aus der DDR in zwei Konzerten des Kairoer
Sinfonie-Orchesters,” Cairo, October 13, 1959.
Performing Diplomatic Relations 497
sporadically in the region in the early 1960s but received little financial
support from the state. Indeed, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stipulated
in 1963 that performances by GDR artists in the Middle East would be ap-
proved if and only if no government subsidies were required.19 The SED
concentrated instead on presenting the GDR as a paragon of industrial
modernism, and attempted to curry favor in theMiddle East through trade
deals and the granting of credit.20
This approach was moderately successful, particularly in the wake of the
Suez crisis, when support for the Soviet Bloc surged in the Middle East. The
GDR signed trade deals with Egypt and Lebanon in 1953 and with Syria in
1955. An East German trade mission opened in Cairo in 1954, and in
1959 the East German prime minister Otto Grotewohl made an official visit
to the city, following which the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, up-
graded the East German trade mission in Cairo to a consulate general, albeit
an unofficial one with limited privileges. Further unofficial consulates, which
brought with them some symbolic status as well as facilitating easier exchange
between countries, opened in Damascus in 1961 and in Iraq in 1962. Yet de-
spite such steps, progress toward the GDR’s goal of full diplomatic recogni-
tion was slow. If states such as Egypt and Syria were more sympathetic to
the Soviet Bloc than they were to the West, they nevertheless wanted to keep
their Western options open and were unwilling to defy the Hallstein Doctrine
outright.21
The GDR’s prospects in the Middle East improved in 1964, when the
Arab nations discovered that the FRG had been sending weapons surrep-
titiously to Israel. Nasser responded to the revelation by inviting the East
German First Secretary, Walther Ulbricht, to Cairo in February 1965 for
a “friendship visit,” which, as HermannWentker observes, had all the trap-
pings of a state visit.22 Over the course of Ulbricht’s stay the two leaders
signed treaties aimed at closer cultural, scientific, and economic engage-
ment, and Ulbricht pledged loans to Egypt totaling $81 million.23 Deter-
mining this heightened engagement with the GDR to be in contravention
of the Hallstein Doctrine, the FRG retaliated by suspending future aid to
Egypt and offering diplomatic recognition to Israel. This in turn prompted
19. See MfAA B 3016, Norbert Jaeschke, “Kulturelle Beziehungen im Jahre 1964—Ihre
HM vom 8.4.1963,” April 30, 1963, 6.
20. In 1958, for example, the GDR made two significant loans to Egypt to facilitate the
country’s industrial modernization; see Winrow, Foreign Policy of the GDR, 54. On East Ger-
many’s attempts to present itself as a paragon of industrial modernism, see Pence, “Showcasing
Cold War Germany.”
21. For an overview of the GDR’s relations with Egypt and other Middle Eastern nations
during this period, see Winrow, Foreign Policy of the GDR, 33–55; Timm, Hammer, Zirkel,
Davidstern, 171–84; Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen; Trentin, “Modernization as
State Building”; and Müller, Spectre Is Haunting Arabia.
22. Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, 281: “Freundschaftsbesuch.”
23. See Winrow, Foreign Policy of the GDR, 69.
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ten of the thirteen states of the Arab League to break their relations with
Bonn. Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen all closed their embassies in the FRG in May 1965, Kuwait fol-
lowing suit shortly thereafter.24 This chain of events augured well for the
GDR, and at first it seemed that offers of diplomatic recognition would be
quick to materialize. When, however, Nasser proposed the idea of consoli-
dating relations with the GDR to the Arab League, he received support
only from Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Seeking consensus, he shelved
the proposition and stopped short of granting the GDR full diplomatic
recognition.25 Suspended in limbo but with the end goal tantalizingly
close, the GDR threw all the resources it could muster at the region. The
process of acquiring diplomatic recognition proved to be a costly business.
The Arab nations made enormous demands, expecting that the shortfall in
trade credits and financial aid they had incurred by breaking from West
Germany would be made up by the GDR. From 1965 the GDR sent mil-
lions of dollars’ worth of weapons and military equipment to Egypt, Syria,
Yemen, and Iraq, and increased its trade to the region significantly.26 It
simply did not have the capacity, however, to match the level of aid that
was being requested of it; as a point of comparison, the FRG had supplied
DM 51,735 million in development aid to the postcolonial world by 1969,
and the GDR only DM 530 million.27 Consequently, the GDR turned to
forms of diplomacy with which it was more at home, and began to supple-
ment its monetary payments by offering the region German cultural, scien-
tific, and sporting capital.28
The GDR was by no means unique among Soviet Bloc countries in mar-
keting an image of itself to postcolonial countries that was inherently nation-
al rather than pan-Soviet. Theodora Dragostinova describes, for example,
how Bulgaria presented itself to Mexico and India as one of the “cradles of
European civilization.”29 This kind of branding had resonances for the non-
aligned world. Leaders of nonaligned states did not pursue relationships
with Eastern European countries purely or even primarily as a means of in-
gratiating themselves with Moscow. On the contrary, they were often inter-
ested in the specific resources that these countries had to offer in their own
24. Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya retained their embassies.
25. See Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, 282.
26. For details of financial aid and arms deliveries, see Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel,
135. Regarding trade credits offered, see Lamm and Kupper, DDR und Dritte Welt, 133–39.
27. See End, Zweimal deutsche Außenpolitik, 127.
28. Gray explains that in the case of Syria, instead of sending fighter planes and pilots as re-
quested, “the GDR sought to deepen ties in the realms of education, commerce, and propagan-
da by replacing ‘bourgeois’Western advisers with East German experts”: Gray, Germany’s Cold
War, 202.
29. Dragostinova, “‘Natural Ally,’” 670. See also Dragostinova and Fidelis, “Introduc-
tion,” 582–83.
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right, be it ideals of Europeanness, technical expertise, or goods, the latter
often at better rates than or of superior quality to those available from the
USSR.30 Interest from nonaligned states in acquiring resources—of the cul-
tural as well as the physical variety—was integral to the effectiveness of the
GDR’s soft power in the Middle East. Janice Bially Mattern conceives of soft
power in terms of a “social relationship.” “Soft power,” she explains, “only
works on those who are attracted to the aspiring power holder.”31 This is
particularly the case when the balance of power between the parties involved
is relatively equal, as was often true of periphery states. Cultural diplomacy
was not something that the GDR could “do to” or bestow on Arab nations:
its aspirations in this regard were constrained by the recipients’ specific needs
and demands.
The GDR notably targeted its music diplomacy only at countries in the
Middle East that already had a Western art music culture, namely Egypt—
or the United Arab Republic (UAR), as it was then known—Syria, and
Lebanon. These countries differed both in what they wanted from the
GDR and in what they could offer in terms of political returns. The Egyp-
tian and Syrian regimes were in many ways natural partners for the GDR:
their pro-revolutionary, anti-imperialist stance resonated with that of the
SED, as did their approach to the arts. Both countries, inspired by Soviet
Bloc models, had implemented centralized state systems for controlling the
production of culture in the 1950s, and were keen to receive support from
Soviet Bloc states for the development of state-sponsored culture.32 Of the
two, Egypt had far greater financial resources to divert toward culture than
Syria, so was more responsive to the GDR’s attempts at music diplomacy.
This undoubtedly suited the East German government: although Nasser’s
star had dimmed somewhat by the late 1960s, Egypt remained the symbolic
center of the pan-Arab movement, and Nasser continued to exert consider-
able influence in the region.33
The extent to which cultural activities in Egypt and Syria were state con-
trolled was particularly conducive to the GDR’s brand of diplomacy. Dealing
in music necessitated liaising directly with the Egyptian and Syrian culture
ministries, which created significant opportunities for GDR officials to estab-
lish high-level relationships. Lebanon was an entirely different matter. In con-
trast to its neighbors, it remained, as Fawaz A. Gerges details, “within the
30. See Dragostinova, “‘Natural Ally,’” 667. On the resources and expertise offered by in-
dividual states, see, for example, Mazurek, “Polish Economists in Nehru’s India”; Muehlenbeck,
Czechoslovakia in Africa; Hong, Cold War Germany; Trentin, “Modernization as State Build-
ing”; and Hilger, “Revolutionsideologie, Systemkonkurrenz.”
31. Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft,” 590–91. On the concept of soft pow-
er more generally, see Nye, Bound to Lead, and Nye, Soft Power.
32. See Winegar, Creative Reckonings, 143–48, and Dragićević Šešić, “Opening Hori-
zons.”
33. See, for example, Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 135–59.
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Western economic and cultural orbit.”34 Factional politics dominated the
country throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and state control was weak. Cul-
ture was a privatized affair—Lebanon did not have a ministry for culture until
the mid-1990s—and followed what Milena Dragićević Šešić describes as a
“market-driven model.”35 As a result, what the GDR could achieve in terms
of its cultural diplomacy remit was limited. There was a significant appetite
for Western art music among the Lebanese intellectual elite, and Beirut and
the Baalbeck Festival were very much part of the international concert circuit
for top Western musicians.36 As such, securing performances in the country
was a useful way for the GDR to demonstrate the ability of its ensembles and,
by implication, the state itself to compete with the best that the West had to
offer. Incorporating concerts in Lebanon into tours to the region also made
good financial sense. The lack of government involvement in the arts, how-
ever, made it difficult for GDR officials to establish meaningful relationships
with those in power.
In what follows, I explore how the GDR used the cultural capital it pos-
sessed in the form of Western art music to strengthen relationships with
Egypt, in particular, but also with Syria and Lebanon in the period be-
tween 1965 and 1970. I examine the way this form of cultural diplomacy
was perceived by the different partners, and analyze what we can learn
about the relationships that evolved between periphery states such as the
GDR and Egypt from the ways in which they negotiated cultural diploma-
cy, and from the discourses that these exchanges inscribed. The research
draws predominantly on government archives and newspapers. Unfortu-
nately, I have not been able to access official archives in Egypt, Syria, or
Lebanon. As a result, I have constructed the narrative that unfolds here
primarily through the archives of the GDR’s Ministry for Culture (held in
the Bundesarchiv in Berlin), its Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and its unof-
ficial consulates in Cairo and Damascus (housed in the Politisches Archiv
des Auswärtigen Amts in Berlin). These repositories contain correspon-
dence and official directives from the Egyptian and Syrian governments
and from those involved with the organization of concerts in Lebanon.
Inevitably, however, the emphasis on German archives results in an imbal-
ance of voices. Homi Bhabha warns that in studies involving a Western
perspective on postcolonial nations, “the site of cultural difference can be-
come the mere phantom of a dire disciplinary struggle in which it has no
space or power. . . . The Other is cited, quoted, framed, illuminated, en-
cased in the shot/reverse-shot strategy of a serial enlightenment . . . [but]
34. Gerges, “Lebanon,” 90.
35. Dragićević Šešić, “Opening Horizons,” 237. See also Maltzahn, “Ministry of Culture.”
36. For details of the numerous international musicians, ensembles, and composers that vis-
ited Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s, see Mainguy, La musique au Liban, 59–77.
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loses its power to signify, to negate, to initiate its historic desire, to establish
its own institutional and oppositional discourse.”37 I have endeavored, at the
very least, to keep this warning in mind. It remains the case, however, that
there will be yet more stories to be told if access to archives in Egypt and Syria
becomes possible.
Western Art Music as a Symbol of Modernity
That a market existed for the GDR’s musical offerings in the Middle East is
indicative of what Dipesh Chakrabarty has described as the “uncritical em-
phasis on modernization” that dominated the discourse of postcolonial na-
tions in the 1950s and 1960s.38 This was a conception of modernization
that, to quote Chakrabarty again, “saw an imaginary Europe as the major
agentive force in the world.” Newly independent nations such as Egypt, Syr-
ia, and Lebanon rarely rejected existing colonial cultures outright; instead,
they reproduced them in hybridized form to create new national cultures.39
Thus, the escalation of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s did not im-
pede the Western art music scene in Egypt. On the contrary, although the
Egyptian Ministry for Culture committed itself to the development of both
the national heritage and Western art music, it diverted considerably more
funds toward the latter.40 It took the Egyptian Radio Orchestra—which had
been founded in 1956—under its auspices in 1959 and renamed it the Cairo
Symphony Orchestra, and in the same year established the Cairo National
Conservatory.41 Subsequently, various measures were implemented that
would increase the prevalence and accessibility of Western art music. The
Cairo Symphony Orchestra, for example, included in its remit an outreach
program that involved free concerts for young people and occasional tours to
the provinces.42 The Ministry for Culture attempted to increase exposure to
high-quality performances by ensuring that “cultural agreements with friend-
ly countries always include a clause which encourages the visits to Egypt of
well-knownmusical ensembles and orchestras,”43 and in 1968 a new radio sta-
tion was established under the auspices of the Cairo Broadcasting Services,
which for twelve hours each day broadcast “the works of the classical com-
posers, the recordings of concerts and recitals and works by Egyptian com-
posers in the Western musical idiom.”44
37. Bhabha, Location of Culture, 46.
38. Chakrabarty, “Legacies of Bandung,” 53.
39. Ibid., 55. On the phenomenon of cultural hybridity, see in particular Bhabha, Location
of Culture.
40. See El-Shawan, “Al-Mūsīka al-‘Arabiyyah,” 122.
41. See El-Shawan, “Western Music and Its Practitioners,” 145–46.
42. See Wahba, Cultural Policy in Egypt, 65.
43. Ibid., 66.
44. Ibid., 67.
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The prominence assigned to Western art music reflects the cultural de-
mographic of those who ascended to power following the collapse of colo-
nialism in the Middle East. The new ruling class emerged by and large
from a European-educated intellectual elite committed to a construct of mo-
dernity that found its apotheosis in European culture. Jonathan Holt Shan-
non describes the tendency of Syrian intellectuals in this period to view Arab
music as “a ‘primitive’ stage of a musical and civilizational progression of
which European art music represented both the greatest achievement and
the standard to be emulated.”45 In Egypt, the equation of Western art music
with progress dated back to the nineteenth century. Isma‘il Pasha’s commis-
sioning of the Cairo Opera House to coincide with the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 was an explicit statement of the country’s coming of age.46
In the decades that followed, the venue assumed utopian qualities for many
upper-class Egyptians, functioning as something of a unique space in cosmo-
politan but segregated Cairo. Writing in 1984, the English literature scholar
Magdi Wahba, who served as Undersecretary of State to the Egyptian Min-
istry for Culture from 1966 to 1970, recalled that in the 1930s “this bastion
of Western culture . . . was (apart from the cinemas) one of the few venues
where Europeans, Levantines and Egyptians mingled freely. They found a
common language in opera.”47 After the revolution in 1952, the perception
of Western art music as a universal phenomenon became more pronounced.
Previously referred to as “al musika al-urubiyya” (European music), it was
reclaimed in the 1950s as “al musika al-alamayyia” (universal music),48 a
shift in terminology that was implicitly bound up with the spirit of the
post-independence Egyptian nation. Indeed, Ali Jihad Racy claims that the
quest for “international music” acquired revolutionary undertones, and that
during the 1960s Egyptian symphonic works written in an “international”
style “emerged as a politicized art form . . . considered indispensable for the
construction of a new progressive national image.”49
Ultimately, the Nasser government envisaged an international music
scene in Egypt that was an implicitly national affair. The Egyptian Ministry
for Culture intended, for example, that the Cairo National Conservatory
would serve as a feeder for the Cairo Symphony Orchestra, anticipating that
by 1975 there would be “enough qualified Egyptian musicians to Egyptian-
ize the Cairo Symphony Orchestra entirely.”50 In the short term, Egypt,
like most Arab nations, needed foreign assistance to fulfill such goals. The
departure following the 1952 revolution of the Italian musicians who had
45. Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees, 76.
46. See Mestyan, Arab Patriotism, 97–133.
47. Wahba, “Cairo Memories,” 74.
48. See El-Shawan, “Al-Mūsīka al-‘Arabiyyah,” 83. See also Racy, “Music in Contemporary
Cairo,” 11.
49. Racy, “Musical Aesthetics in Present-Day Cairo,” 403.
50. Wahba, Cultural Policy in Egypt, 64.
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dominated the Western art music scene in the 1930s and 1940s had left a
large void.51 Foreign musicians were required to staff the Cairo Symphony
Orchestra and National Conservatory, and there was an urgent desire for vis-
its by elite international performing ensembles to raise the quality of musical
life and, more importantly, to validate the new republic as a modern, cosmo-
politan state. The GDR had much to offer in this context, not only in terms
of its tangible musical assets, but also in the extent to which it, and Germany
more generally, could provide a model for the way in which Western art mu-
sic might contribute to Egypt’s nation-building project. Revealing, for exam-
ple, is Mahmud Khattab’s review in al-Jumhuriyya of one of the Dresdner
Philharmonie’s Cairo concerts in 1967, in which he locates the orchestra’s
origins in the revolutionary beginnings of a new state:
One of the oldest and most famous orchestras in Germany, its founding and the
stages of its artistic development reflect the development of modern Germany
itself. It was founded in 1870, which was also the decisive year that witnessed
the unification of Germany and the confirmation of its political existence in
Europe, thus reaffirming the close link between a state’s political growth and its
artistic renaissance.52
A Middle East for the GDR
For its own citizens the GDR packaged its musical endeavors in the Middle
East very much as an ideological exercise. Press coverage of state-sponsored
activities was steeped in the tropes of anti-imperialist solidarity that charac-
terized attitudes to the postcolonial world across the Soviet Bloc from the
Khrushchev era onward. Stalin had adhered rigidly to Marx’s five-stage
model of societal evolution, which spanned from primitive communism
through slavery, serfdom, and capitalism to socialism, and justified his lack
of support for radical movements in Africa and Asia on the basis that postco-
lonial states had not yet progressed far enough through this model for an
effective transition to socialism. Khrushchev adopted a more pragmatic ap-
proach. Sensitive to the growing power of the nonaligned states and the
need to present socialist modernism as a desirable alternative to Western
capitalism, he argued for a model of historical development in which the
51. On the role played by the Italian diaspora in shaping Egypt’s musical life in the first half
of the twentieth century, see El-Shawan, “Western Music and Its Practitioners,” 143–45.
52. Mahmud Khattab, “Bunjarts Yaqud al-Urkistra min al-Dhakira!” [Bongartz conducts
the orchestra from memory!], al-Jumhuriyya, January 12, 1967: “Wa-huwwa min ashhar wa-
aqdam al-urkistrat fi almaniya.. bal anna nashatah wa-marahil tatawwurih al-fanniyya in‘ikas li-
marahil tatawwur almaniya fi tarikhiha al-hadith, fa-qad ta’assasa ‘am 1870, wa-huwwa al-‘am
al-hasim alladhi shahida iktimal wahdaha wa ta’kid kayaniha al-siyasi fi uruba kulliha wa-huwwa
amr yu’akkid al-sila al-wathiqa bayn al-numuww al-siyasi li-dawla ma wa-l-nahda al-fanniyya
biha.”
504 Journal of the American Musicological Society
capitalist stage could be avoided altogether with the help of Soviet interven-
tion. As he explained at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1956, “In order to create an independent national economy
and to raise the living standards of their peoples, these countries, though not
part of the world socialist system, can benefit by its achievements.”53 This
perspective was very much in evidence in the East German press coverage of
the Deutsche Staatsoper’s 1969 visit to Cairo. The Egyptians were portrayed
as a modernizing nation, whose capacity for socialist enlightenment was re-
flected in their appreciation of the Germanic musical heritage. Newspapers
gleefully compared the Staatsoper’s sold-out run with the failure a month
earlier of the Ballet de l’Opéra national de Paris to sell tickets, and provided
effusive accounts of the warm reception accorded to the opera company.54
The Berliner Zeitung revealed that the Egyptian Minister for Culture, Thar-
wat Okasha, had declared himself upon meeting the company to be a “long-
standing friend of the German art of opera.”55 The Staatsoper’s conductor
Otmar Suitner meanwhile was generous in his praise of the Cairo audience.
He observed in Neue Zeit that “the level of attentiveness and deep under-
standing moved us all a great deal. For us it is a joy to play here, because such
a strong response is unrivaled in other concert halls.”56 Yet if the Egyptians
were depicted as kindred spirits, press reports did not present the partnership
between Egypt and the GDR as being one of equals. In the spirit of Khrush-
chev’s interventionist model, the GDR invariably cast itself in a benevolent,
paternalistic role: it was assisting the development of the Arab nations from
its position of cultural superiority. Several newspapers, for example, recounted
that Okasha during his meeting with the Staatsoper had acknowledged that
“it is not for the first time that the GDR helps the UAR, not only culturally
but also politically.”57
This political help was framed by the East German media as support for
the Arab nations in their struggle against Israel, which Ulbricht dismissed
as a colony of the United States.58 When the Six-Day War broke out in
53. Quoted in Westad, Global Cold War, 68. Westad provides an excellent summary of the
theoretical and practical contexts of Soviet foreign policy in the early Cold War (39–72).
54. See, for example, Karl-Heinz Werner, “Kairo, im März 1969: Staatsoper begeistert am
Nil,” Neues Deutschland, March 18, 1969, 4.
55. “Staatsoper in Kairo gefeiert: erfolgreicher Beginn des Gastspiels,” Berliner Zeitung,
March 7, 1969, 1: “ein langjähriger Freund der deutschen Opernkunst.”
56. “Begeisterungsstürme amNil: zum erfolgreichen Kairo-Gastspiel der Deutschen Staats-
oper,” Neue Zeit, March 12, 1969, 4: “Eine solche Aufmerksamkeit und ein solch tiefes Ver-
ständnis haben uns alle sehr bewegt. Für uns ist es eine Freude, hier zu musizieren, denn eine
solch starke Resonanz dürfte ihresgleichen in anderen Konzertsälen suchen.”
57. Horst Richter, “Mit Mozart und Strauss in Kairo: nach dem Gastspiel der Deutschen
Staatsoper in der VAR-Hauptstadt,” Berliner Zeitung, March 26, 1969, 6: “nicht zum ersten
Mal, daß die DDR der VAR hilft, nicht nur kulturell, sondern auch politisch.”
58. See “Walther Ulbricht erklärt in der VAR-Zeitung Al Ahram: Ziel des Staatsbesuchs ist
die Festigung der Freundschaft und der Zusammenarbeit,” Neues Deutschland, February 24,
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June 1967, the Berliner Zeitung notably brought home the relevance of
the conflict for GDR citizens by publishing statements of support by East
German artists who had performed in the region. Friedrich-Carl Erben,
leader of the Erben String Quartet, gave a personal slant to events, com-
menting, “I am doubly hit by the news of the war in the Near East, because
I have made many good friends on my tours to the UAR and Syria, about
whom I am very worried.”59 The baritone Günther Leib meanwhile em-
phasized the threat to those aspects of Egypt that resonated most closely
with the GDR’s own self-image—cultural heritage and revolutionary
progress. He denounced the “interference of the USA, who are supporting
the Israeli aggressor,” and expressed dismay that, “as a result of the aggres-
sion, not only the old cultural monuments are in danger but also the great
social and cultural achievements that the Egyptian people have realized
since the revolution of 1952.”60 Such rhetoric set the stage for the RSO
Leipzig’s tour to the Middle East two months later, which was billed ex-
plicitly as a gesture of solidarity. The East German Deputy Minister for
Culture, Kurt Bork, traveled with the orchestra, and introduced the con-
certs in Damascus and Cairo with a speech—widely reported in the East
German press—in which he declared the GDR’s support for the Arab na-
tions in their anti-imperial struggle.61
The idealistic rhetoric that pervaded East German media reports was
often at odds with the realities of the GDR’s actions in and attitudes to-
ward the Middle East. One of the most striking aspects of the state’s for-
eign policy is the extent to which it was devoid of the ideological concerns
that dominated domestic politics.62 The SED’s drive at home to make cul-
ture accessible to the masses, for example, did not extend in any sincere
way to its diplomatic programs. In the case of Egypt, the SED was in the-
ory assisting the Nasser government with its civilizing mission to bring
high culture to the Egyptian subaltern. In practice, however, the drive to
reclaim Western art music for the postcolonial state had done little to
change the demographic of concert audiences. Despite attempts by the
Egyptian Ministry for Culture to make events accessible through heavily
subsidized or free tickets, attendance at concerts by the Cairo Symphony
1965, 3. On the GDR’s stance vis-à-vis Israel, see Timm, Hammer, Zirkel, Davidstern, and
Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel.
59. “Empörung trifft die Friedensbrecher: DDR-Künstler an der Seite der arabischen
Völker,” Berliner Zeitung, June 7, 1967, 5: “Ich bin doppelt betroffen von der Nachricht des
Krieges im Nahen Osten, da ich auf meinen Gastspielreisen in die VAR und nach Syrien gute
Freunde gefunden habe, um die ich sehr besorgt bin.”
60. Ibid.: “Die Einmischung der USA, die den israelischen Aggressor unterstützen. . . .
Durch die Aggression sind sowohl die alten Kulturdenkmäler in Gefahr als auch die großen so-
zialen und kulturellen Errungenschaften, die das ägyptische Volk seit der Revolution von 1952
erzielt hat.”
61. See “Konzert-Gastspiel,” Berliner Zeitung, August 29, 1967, 6.
62. See Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, 2.
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Orchestra and visiting ensembles was generally poor and, as Salwa Aziz
El-Shawan notes, restricted to an exclusive club of “European-educated
Egyptians and foreigners.”63 Concerts were broadcast on Egyptian radio
and television, which gave them a reach beyond the concert halls,64 but
the listenership for these was again limited. Writing in 1985, El-Shawan
notably observed that “[f]or a small elite, Western music and Egyptian
symphonic compositions continue to symbolize modernity and progress,
but for most Egyptians, these are alien traditions to which they can relate
only with difficulty.”65 This circumstance did not give East German poli-
ticians particular cause for concern. On the contrary, as noted in a 1969 re-
port by Horst Winter, the official in charge of culture at the GDR
consulate in Cairo, “classical music and opera speak to a relatively small
portion [of the population], which comprises, however, the ruling classes
of the country and is therefore of vital importance, not least from the per-
spective of the diplomatic effects of such cultural events.”66
In Lebanon, the division between classical music audiences and the gen-
eral populace was even more pronounced. Here concerts of classical music
were generally well attended.67 In the absence of any public subsidies for
culture, however, they were organized by and for the wealthy elite and were
largely the preserve of the state’s French-speaking rather than Arabic pop-
ulation. This phenomenon was particularly manifest where the prestigious
Baalbeck Festival was concerned. In order to ensure an East German pres-
ence at the festival, GDR officials found themselves wooing the very cultural
imperialists they were supposed to be fighting against. The irony was not
lost on them. The Ministry for Culture official who accompanied the RSO
Leipzig on its 1967 tour took the opportunity to negotiate further openings
63. El-Shawan, “Al-Mūsīka al-‘Arabiyyah,” 124–25.
64. See, for example, the letter from Horst Winter of the GDR consulate in Cairo to Kurt
Walter of the GDR Ministry for Culture, December 19, 1967, in which he reports that all of
the Cairo Symphony Orchestra concerts conducted by the East German conductor Gerhart
Wiesenhütter in the final months of 1967 had been broadcast on Egyptian radio: MfAA B
1003/69. Similarly, the first of the RSO Leipzig’s concerts in Cairo was recorded for broadcast
on Egyptian television; see Salah Darwish, “Na’ib Wazir al-Thaqafa al-Almani Yaqul: al-Musiqa
Wasila li-Tarbiyat Ruh al-Wataniyya lada al-Sha‘b ..wa-Qa’id Urkistra Laybzij Yaqul: al-Sha‘b
al-Masri ladayh Hassa Musiqiyya Tafuq Hassat al-Shu‘ub al-Urubiyya” [German Deputy Min-
ister of Culture says, “Music is a way to foster a spirit of nationalism among the people”; con-
ductor of the Leipzig Orchestra says, “Egyptians have a sensitivity for music that surpasses
that of European peoples”], al-Jumhuriyya, August 23, 1967.
65. El-Shawan, “Western Music and Its Practitioners,” 151.
66. MfAA B 1304/76, “Ergebnisse und Probleme der kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen
Auslandsbeziehungen der DDR in der VAR im Jahre 1969,” 28: “Klassische Musik und klas-
sisches Musiktheater sprechen einen relativ kleinen Teil an, der sich aber zusammensetzt aus den
Führungsschichten des Landes und deshalb von großer Bedeutung ist auch im Hinblick auf die
auslandsinformatorische Wirkung solcher künstlerischen Ereignisse.”
67. See, for example, MfAA B 1147/75, “Auszug aus dem Bericht des Genossen Rudolf
Greiser über die Tournee des Bachorchesters des Gewandhauses zu Leipzig nach Manila, Singa-
pur, Kuala Lumpur, Bombay, Beirut,” 1.
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for the GDR in the region; describing the Baalbeck Festival committee as
comprising “reactionary circles,” he conceded that “as long as we have few
other means of gaining a foothold in Lebanon with artistic performances, we
need to take advantage of the committee.”68
If the selective targeting of the GDR’s musical activities in the Middle
East was at odds with socialist ideology, it was in keeping with wider patterns
of public diplomacy. Nicholas Cull describes public diplomacy, of which
music diplomacy can be considered a subset, as “an international actor’s at-
tempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics (tradi-
tionally government-to-people contact).” As he explains, however, “despite
addressing publics, public diplomacy does not necessarily engage a mass au-
dience. Public diplomats have always spent some—or sometimes most—of
their energy focusing on significant individuals in the knowledge that they
can, in their turn, either communicate to the wider public . . . or become the
government insiders in time.”69 Such a circumstance is illustrated vividly by
the surviving photographs of the first concert that the East German conduc-
tor Gerhart Wiesenhütter gave with the Cairo Symphony Orchestra in Octo-
ber 1967 (see Figures 1–3).70 The concert took place in Cairo’s brand-new
Sayed Darwish Hall, which was located on the outskirts of the city near the
Giza pyramids and, as Wiesenhütter noted, accessible only by car.71 As dem-
onstrated by the numerous empty seats visible in Figure 2, the hall was far
from filled to capacity. Moreover, the audience members captured in the
photograph are, without exception, attired in Western dress, which in
1960s Egypt was synonymous with the urban elite.72 The success of the
concert from an East German perspective, meanwhile, is captured in Figure
3. Here the GDR’s unofficial ambassador to Egypt, Ernst Scholz (second
from the right), assumes a very official position alongside Tharwat Okasha
(center) and the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, Boris Vindarov (far right).73
A GDR for the Middle East: Programming for Diplomacy
The question of what role music plays, or is perceived to play, in effecting soft
power is one that invariably needs to be asked in studies of music diplomacy.
68. MfAA B 1003/69, Kurt Walter, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise in den Libanon, die SAR
und die VAR vom 16.8 bis 27.8.1967,”October 2, 1967, 4–5: “aus reaktionären Kreisen zusam-
mengesetzt. . . . Solange wir aber nur geringe andere Möglichkeiten haben, mit künstlerischen
Leistungen im Libanon Fuß zu fassen, müssen wir das Komitee dazu ausnutzen.”
69. Cull, Cold War, xv–xvi.
70. The photographs are located in BArch DR 1/27073.
71. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Werner Rackwitz,
November 9, 1967, 1.
72. See Abaza, “Shifting Landscapes of Fashion,” 286–88.
73. Günther Drefahl (seen on the far left in Figure 3) led the GDR delegation of the joint
GDR-UAR scientific council.
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Notably, GDR officials do not seem to have assigned music any transcenden-
tal properties in this regard. Discussions surrounding its efficacy in foreign
policy were generally prosaic: it was valued primarily as a tool for raising the
state’s profile. The Ministry for Culture declared in 1964 that “music is not
bound to language. There are thus many opportunities to publicize our
achievements abroad.”74 Yet an examination of what East German ensem-
bles actually performed in concerts in the Middle East indicates that music
served as far more than a blunt tool of advertising. The repertoire that was
programmed, as laid out in the Appendix below, functioned to articulate
common ground—both existing and potential—between states. Concerts
offered sonic enactments of the diplomatic relations to which the GDR
Figure 1 Gerhart Wiesenhütter and the Cairo Symphony Orchestra in Sayed Darwish Hall,
Cairo, October 7, 1967. Bundesarchiv, Berlin. Used by permission.
74. BArch DR 1/8651, “Vorlage für den Beirat für Auslandsinformation,” 2: “Die Musik
ist nicht an die Sprache gebunden. Deshalb gibt es viele Möglichkeiten, unsere Leistungen im
Ausland bekannt zu machen.”
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aspired, they illuminated shared cultural synergies, and they conveyed affini-
ties with the political concerns of Arab nations, at least to the extent that
these concerns were understood by GDR actors. Western art music repre-
sented a particularly useful site for emphasizing the clear congruencies that
existed between the cultural politics of the Ulbricht and Nasser govern-
ments. Both regimes assigned an inherently conservative role to culture
within their revolutionary ideals, locating the impetus for sociocultural
progress in existing traditions. In the GDR, socialist enlightenment and the
much-vaunted Communist utopia was predicated not on cultural revolution,
but on building on the achievements of the Germanic cultural heritage.75
Figure 2 The audience at the Cairo Symphony Orchestra concert in Sayed Darwish Hall,
Cairo, October 7, 1967. Bundesarchiv, Berlin. Used by permission.
75. See Kelly, Composing the Canon.
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This same heritage resonated in Egypt not for its latent socialist potential
but for the ways in which it might illuminate a musical path to nationhood.
It also, crucially, embodied an ideal of Europeanness that was distinct from
the country’s largely Italianate colonial cultural past.
Such congruencies were key to music’s potential for fostering interstate
allegiances. Yet apparent cultural proximities could also be deceptive and
open to misinterpretation, particularly given the numerous actors involved
in determining what was played by GDR ensembles. The Egyptian Ministry
for Culture, for example, sometimes made requests; East German staff at the
state’s unofficial consulates offered advice; officials in Berlin advised and dic-
tated in varying measures; and artists themselves exerted some autonomy.
Figure 3 (From left to right) Günther Drefahl, Mrs Okasha, Tharwat Okasha, Ernst Scholz,
and Boris Vindarov at the Cairo Symphony Orchestra concert in Sayed Darwish Hall, Cairo,
October 7, 1967. Bundesarchiv, Berlin. Used by permission.
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This array of voices, and the ensuing combination of responsive and antici-
patory programming, worked both for and against the effectiveness of con-
certs. At times, the music performed, enhanced, and even preempted po-
litical relationships; at other times, East German assumptions about the
aesthetic appetites or cultural needs of Arab audiences missed the mark. The
aspects of concerts that proved most problematic were paradoxically often
those that were most clearly signposted as acts of cultural diplomacy. The
packaging of the RSO Leipzig tour in terms of anti-imperialist solidarity was
given credence by the inclusion of Syrian violinist Nejmi Succari as the solo-
ist in the first Baalbeck and Damascus concerts, and by the programming for
the second Baalbeck concert of Cypriot-Lebanese composer Anis Fuleihan’s
Baalbeck Overture, which was commissioned by the Baalbeck Festival com-
mittee especially for the event.76 Fuleihan had been instrumental in estab-
lishing the Beirut Conservatory in the 1950s.77 He was also, however, a
US citizen who, as the East Germans discovered when they arrived in Leb-
anon for the concert, had spent time in Israel. This prompted Kurt Bork to
approach the Lebanese Minister for National Education to inquire if there
would be any opposition to the RSO Leipzig performing one of Fuleihan’s
works. Encapsulating the separation of culture and state in the country, the
Lebanese minister reportedly responded that “the Festival committee was an
independent institution, which determined the festival program itself, and
that misunderstandings would therefore be ruled out.”78 Consequently, the
concert went ahead as planned, but without the political impact that GDR
officials had doubtless intended for it.
Other similar attempts to program compositions by Arab composers
failed to come to fruition. The Staatskapelle Berlin invited the Egyptian
composer Gamal Abdel-Rahim to send a piece for soprano and chamber
orchestra—Das Feuer und die Worte—to be performed during its Cairo res-
idency. Several weeks before the trip was due to commence, however, he
was informed that the orchestral parts had arrived in Berlin too late for the
piece to be rehearsed to a sufficient standard.79 The Dresdner Philharmonie,
meanwhile, made no approaches to Arab composers; the orchestra alluded
instead to more general themes of international solidarity through the inclu-
sion in two of its Egyptian concerts of Bongartz’s own symphonic poem
Patria o muerte: Fidel Castro und dem kubanischen Volk in aufrichtiger Be-
wunderung (Fatherland or death: For Fidel Castro and the Cuban people
76. See MfAA B 1003/69, Kurt Walter, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise in den Libanon,”
2–3.
77. See Mainguy, La musique au Liban, 41–42.
78. See MfAA B 1003/69, Kurt Walter, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise in den Libanon,”
3: “daß das Festivalkomitee eine selbständige Institution sei, das den Inhalt des Programms
des Festivals selbst bestimme und daß Mißverständnisse daher ausgeschlossen seien.”
79. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 3, letter from Horst Richter to Gamal Abdel-Rahim,
February 19, 1969.
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in sincere admiration). Bongartz had composed the work to conduct during
a visit to Havana in 1961.80 If, however, the Dresdner Philharmonie’s per-
formances of it in Egypt were intended to invoke the spirit of international
solidarity, the message was lost in translation. Only the first part of the work’s
title (“Patria o muerte”) was actually listed in the program, and no program
notes were provided. Writing in Le Progrès Égyptien, the critic Albert Bajoc-
chi admonished that “where a piece of program music is concerned, it would
perhaps have been useful to reveal its subject to the public.”81
Notably, the absence of a program was not Bajocchi’s primary objection
to Bongartz’s composition. In an otherwise glowing review of the orchestra’s
Cairo concert of January 8, he complained that “whether the subject be the
Spanish Civil War or the Cuban Revolution, this symphonic poem bewilders
with its deliberate opposition of styles, which do not seem very felicitous. A
heroic exposition with modernist pretentions that employs bold means of
execution is followed by a second section of appalling banality: a typically
trivial military march in a perfectly conventional style.”82 The style of in-
ternationalism that was favored by Egyptian composers in the 1950s and
1960s had resonances with socialist realism. Writing in 1981, Racy explained
that “the main vision for Egypt’s ‘international music’ has been the emulation
of the late and post-Romantic symphonic models.”He described as major in-
spirations “composers such as Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, and Khacha-
turian, who composed elaborate programmatic symphonic works, and who
often utilized folk musical elements,” and explained that “such works are con-
sidered best suited for combining ‘internationalism’ with the depiction of na-
tional and political ideas.”83 Characteristic of this trend are the compositions
of ‘Azīz Al-Shawān, who studied in Moscow with Khachaturian and whose
symphonic works introduce Arabic inflections into a musical language that is
inherently grounded in the Western art music tradition. Despite some general
aesthetic parallels, however, socialist realism in its broader political sense was
not a particularly appealing ideology in Egypt. Kurt Bork, for example, found
himself challenged in relation to its repressive nature in an interview for al-
Jumhuriyya, published shortly after the Deutsche Staatsoper’s visit to Cairo.
The interviewer, Fawzi Sulayman, countered Bork’s claim that “we [in the
GDR] are open to all artistic directions,” by asking, “Even for avant-garde
80. See “Tabletten zur Schnelldiagnose,” Neue Zeit, January 6, 1962, 1.
81. Albert Bajocchi, “Heinz Bongartz dirige à l’Opéra la Philharmonie de Dresde,” Le Pro-
grès Égyptien, January 11, 1967, 5: “S’agissant d’uneœuvre à progamme, il aurait été utile peut-
être d’en révéler l’argument au public.”
82. Ibid: “Quel qu’en soit le sujet guerre d’Espagne ou révolution cubaine ce poème sym-
phonique surprend par des oppositions de style certes voulues, mais qui ne semblent pas très
heureuses. A un exorde héroïque de prétentions modernistes et qui fait recours aux grands moy-
ens d’execution fait suite une deuxième partie d’une banalité consternante: une marche militaire
comme toute assez triviale et d’une écriture parfaitement conventionelle.”
83. Racy, “Music in Contemporary Cairo,” 19.
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theater? Beckett and Ionesco for example?” and proceeded to probe Bork
about socialist realism under Zhdanov, arguing that it “was not open to the
horizons of human potential that you are now talking about, especially in the
period 1945–56.”84
The new music that the GDR exported to Egypt cannot have done
much to assuage doubts about the potential of socialist realism. Bajocchi
was not the first to question the quality of East German works selected for
performance in Egypt. The inclusion of Hans-Georg Görner’s Ei du feiner
Reiter: Variationen zu einem Landsknechtslied von Samuel Scheidt (1624)
für großes Orchester, op. 25, in the concerts conducted by Udo Nissen
with the Cairo Symphony Orchestra in 1959 had met with an unenthusi-
astic response from the GDR’s unofficial vice-consul to Egypt, Alfred
Marter. Reporting to the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Marter ob-
served that the piece was “politely received,” but “appealed to hardly any-
one here. It is too flat and uninteresting for the Egyptian taste.” As a
consequence, he concluded, “we issued no propaganda to the effect that
a living GDR composer is the creator of these variations. That would not
have been of use to us.”85 Görner, a church composer who had joined the
Nazi party in 1930 and served from 1933 as church music advisor in
Alfred Rosenberg’s Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur (Militant League for
German Culture), was hardly a prototypical socialist realist composer.86
Indeed, with the exception of Hanns Eisler, East Germany’s most promi-
nent composers were conspicuous by their absence from performances in
the Middle East (see the Appendix). While the RSO Leipzig showcased
Soviet socialist realism, programming works by Prokofiev and Shostako-
vich, other orchestras featured works by GDR composers of national
rather than international renown. At one level, this can be ascribed to the
predilections of individual conductors. The Dresdner Philharmonie and
Gewandhausorchester were supporting local Saxon composers in pro-
moting respectively Siegfried Kurz and Otto Reinhold: Kurz was a promi-
nent Dresden figure, who was better known as Staatskapellmeister of the
Semperoper, while Reinhold’s Triptychon was a work that Kurt Masur had
84. Fawzi Sulayman, “Ma‘a Na’ib Wazir al-Thaqafa fi Almaniya al-Dimuqratiyya” [With
the Democratic German Republic Deputy Minister of Culture], al-Jumhuriyya, March 24,
1969: “Innana naftah abwaban li-kull al-ittijahat”; “Hatta al-masrah al-tali‘i.. Bikit wa-Yunisku
mathalan?”; “Fa-kana . . . ghayr muftahayn li-l-afaq al-insaniyya allati tahaddathta ‘anha . . wa-
khassa fi-l-fitra bayn 1945–1956.”
85. MfAA A 12238, Alfred Marter, “Einschätzung des politischen und künstlerischen
Erfolges,” 6: “Die Variationen von Goerner auf ‘Ei du feiner Reiter’ wurden höflich aufge-
nommen. Das Stück hat hier wohl kaum jemandem gefallen. Es ist zu flach und uninteressant
nicht nur für den ägyptischen Geschmack. Deshalb haben wir auch keine Propaganda in der
Richtung gemacht, daß ein lebender DDR-Komponist Schöpfer dieser Variationen ist. Das
hätte uns nicht genützt.”
86. See Klingberg, “Die Göttinger Händel-Gesellschaft,” 127.
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conducted on a number of occasions in the 1960s and recorded with the
Dresdner Philharmonie on the GDR’s Eterna label in 1971.87
The programming of new music was likely also shaped by political ten-
sions in theMiddle East. At home, the SEDwas adamant that its anti-Zionist
stance did not equate to anti-Semitism. In the case of the Six-Day War, it
emphasized this point by publishing in the main SED newspaper, Neues
Deutschland, statements of support for the Arab nations that were penned by
some of the GDR’s most prominent Jewish intellectuals.88 Where the state’s
dealings with the Middle East were concerned, the distinction between anti-
Zionism and anti-Semitism was less clear-cut. Eager to circumnavigate po-
tential obstacles in their quest for diplomatic recognition, East German offi-
cials were quick to downplay any vestiges of Jewishness in GDR culture.
Revealing, for example, is the invitation that the unofficial GDR consulate in
Cairo extended to musicologist Samha El-Kholy and composer Abdel-
Rahim to attend the Musik-Biennale in Berlin in 1967. The program for the
event included the 1961 cantata Jüdische Chronik composed by Paul Dessau,
Rudolf Wagner-Régeny, Boris Blacher, Hans Werner Henze, and Karl Ama-
deus Hartmann in response to a resurgence of anti-Semitism in the FRG.
Apprehensive about the way in which the Egyptian guests might react to the
work, the consulate produced for them a tailored copy of the program in
which the title “Jüdische Chronik” was blanked out, leaving only the generic
heading “Chorsinfonisches Konzert.” As Horst Winter explained to the
GDR Ministry for Culture, “We did not think it was appropriate to disclose
to the guests what the concert on 11/3 is actually called.”89
More pernicious was the stipulation by the GDRMinistry for Foreign Af-
fairs that East German citizens of Jewish descent and works by Jewish artists
should not be sent to the Middle East in an official capacity. This caused
some consternation where literature was concerned. The arm of theMinistry
for Culture responsible for book production in the GDR (the Hauptverwal-
tung Verlage und Buchhandel) argued that the removal of Jewish writers
such as Johannes R. Becher, Anna Seghers, and Arnold Zweig from a list of
works selected for translation into Arabic would result in an “unacceptable
distortion of the profile of our contemporary literature.”90 The Ministry for
87. Masur performed the work, for example, with the Prague Symphony Orchestra at the
Prague Spring Festival in 1960; see H.B., “Musik verbindet die Völker: Erlebnis vom Prager
Frühling / Erfolg Kurt Masurs,” Berliner Zeitung, May 28, 1960, 6.
88. See Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel, 51–52.
89. MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Herbert Geerhardt, Department of
Cultural Relations, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, February 28, 1967: “Wir hielten es nicht für
zweckmäßig, hier den Gästen mitzuteilen, wie das Konzert am 11.3. tatsächlich bezeichnet ist.”
90. Reported in BArch DR 1/18876, vol. 1, letter from Köhler, Department of Interna-
tional Relations, Ministry for Culture, to Helmut Tautz, Department of Cultural Relations,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, January 6, 1966: “eine unvertretbare Verzerrung des Profils un-
serer Gegenwartsliteratur.”
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Foreign Affairs, however, argued for the necessity of such measures, explain-
ing that,
because of the role that Israel plays in the Arab world, these problems posed by
the relations of the GDR to the Arab states merit particular care and must be
handled with extraordinary sensitivity. The situation remains that an awkward
confrontation with the Egyptian side in relation to such issues (the sending of
persons of Jewish descent within the framework of the official culture working
plan, literary propaganda involving works by Jewish writers, or works con-
cerned with Jewish issues, etc.) could have a negative effect on relations with
Egypt.91
This policy, which was by no means unique to the GDR—the United States
had adopted a similar approach in the 1950s92—could perhaps explain the
omission from concert programs of works by prominent Jewish composers
such as Dessau and Ernst HermannMeyer. It is true that Eisler was also Jew-
ish, but the context in which he was presented by the Staatskapelle Berlin was
a specifically German one. Uniting the works by GDR composers that were
performed in the Middle East was a strong historicizing bent, be it Görner’s
neoclassical tribute to Scheidt or the echoes of Max Reger in Reinhold’s
Triptychon. Eisler’s cantata Das Vorbild is particularly conspicuous in this re-
gard. A composition that opens with a reworking of the Fugue in G Minor
from Book 1 of the Well-Tempered Clavier, its positioning in an otherwise
all-Bach program evoked a historical Germany, which, as William Glenn
Gray notes, was held in esteem by many Arabs.93
Opera for Export
The Egyptians were most interested in hearing works from the German mu-
sical canon, the German operatic canon in particular. Opera enjoyed much
greater popularity in Egypt than symphonic music. Since its inception in the
mid-nineteenth century, however, Egyptian operatic culture had been an
exclusively Italian affair. Audiences were introduced to the art form in the
1840s through works by Donizetti, Luigi Ricci, Bellini, Rossini, and Verdi at
91. BArch DR 1/18876, vol. 1, letter from Helmut Tautz to Köhler, January 19, 1966:
“Auf Grund der Rolle, die Israel im arabischen Raum spielt, verdienen diese Probleme in den
Beziehungen der DDR zu den arabischen Staaten eine besondere Beachtung und müssen mit
außerordentlichem Fingerspitzengefühl behandelt werden. Die Situation ist noch immer so, daß
eine ungeschickte Konfrontation der ägyptischen Seite mit solchen Fragen (Entsendung von Per-
sonen jüdischer Abstammung im Rahmen der staatlichen Kulturarbeitspläne, Literaturpropa-
ganda mit Werken jüdischer Schriftsteller oder mit Werken, die jüdische Probleme betreffen
usw.) sich nachteilig auf die Beziehungen zur VAR auswirken könnte.”
92. See Carr, “Diplomatic Notes,” 45.
93. Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 89.
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the Teatro del Cairo and the Italian theater in Alexandria,94 and Italian opera
cemented its stronghold on the country when the Cairo Opera House
opened in 1869. The inaugural performance there of Rigoletto, followed two
years later by the world premiere of Aida, set the stage for an annual opera
season that showcased touring companies from Italy for the next century.95
The extent to which opera had become synonymous with Italy was in
part a legacy of the specifically Italianate nature of Isma‘il’s vision of
Europeanization.96 It also reflected the influence of the Italian diaspora in
pre-revolutionary Egypt, which at its peak in the early 1930s numbered
over 50,000 members.97 In post-revolutionary Egypt, opera retained its
prestige. Ministry officials seem, however, to have been keen to divest it
of its khedival and colonial associations by weakening the Italian domi-
nance of the art form. In 1961, for example, Okasha oversaw the first opera
production in Arabic at the Cairo Opera House—a staging of Franz Le-
hár’s Die lustige Witwe, translated by Abdel-Rahman Al-Khamissi and star-
ring Egyptian soprano Ratiba El-Hefny.98 The Egyptian government was
especially eager to introduce German opera and specifically Richard Wag-
ner to Cairo. In 1958, Mahmoud Nahas, an officer in the Ministry for Cul-
ture and National Guidance and the general manager of the Cairo Opera
House, approached the GDR trade mission to inquire about the possibility
of bringing over an East German opera company to stage some of Wag-
ner’s works. The trade mission deemed this request unfeasible, reporting
back to the GDR Ministry for Culture that Wagner’s operas were unlikely
ever to be performed in Egypt given that the orchestra pit of the Cairo
Opera House could hold only sixty-five players. They also argued that it
would be “truly paradoxical, if we were to implement our cultural propa-
ganda with Wagner of all things, and then perhaps with the introduction
of Lohengrin and Tristan und Isolde!”99 The question of Wagner’s rele-
vance was the subject of much debate in the GDR in the mid-1950s, the
cultural intelligentsia being undecided as to whether the pessimism and
irrationalism of his works could be reconciled with Marxist aesthetics.100
Notably where cultural diplomacy was concerned, the ideological obstacles
surrounding his operas proved less of a barrier than the practical ones; in
94. See Mestyan, “Sound, Military Music, and Opera,” 650–51.
95. See Wahba, Cultural Policy in Egypt, 62.
96. See Mestyan, Arab Patriotism, 119.
97. See Gorman, “Italians of Egypt,” 141.
98. See Ati Metwaly, “The Life and Times of an Arab Soprano: Ratiba El-Hefny and The
Merry Widow,” Ahram Online, April 3, 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/68393
.aspx.
99. MfAA A 12235, letter from Treitschke to Ingeborg Lockhoff, Department of Cultural
Relations, Ministry for Culture, August 30, 1958, 3: “Andererseits wäre es ja gerade Paradox,
wenn wir zur Durchsetzung unserer Kulturpropaganda ausgerechnet mit Wagner, und dann
vielleicht noch mit Lohengrin und Tristan und Isolde aufwarten würden!”
100. See Kelly, Composing the Canon, 64–95.
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1959, the composer featured prominently in Nissen’s concert with the
Cairo Symphony Orchestra, which included both the prelude to Die Meis-
tersinger von Nürnberg and Elisabeth’s aria “Dich, teure Halle” from
Tannhäuser.101
Egyptian officials began a more concerted drive to bring German opera to
Cairo as relations between Egypt and the GDR strengthened in the late
1960s. In 1966 Samha El-Kholy visited the GDR on behalf of the Egyptian
Ministry for Culture to ascertain, among other things, whether the Deutsche
Staatsoper might send a chamber ensemble to Cairo to lead an Egyptian or-
chestra and choir in a number of stagings. El-Kholy suggested as possibilities
the following productions—all requiring small forces—from the Staatsoper’s
repertoire: Così fan tutte, Ariadne auf Naxos, Die Walküre, and Dessau and
Brecht’s Die Verurteilung des Lukullus.102 (The inclusion of Lukullus sug-
gests that the issue of artists’ Jewishness was perhaps of greater concern for
the East Germans than it was for the Egyptians.) No agreement was reached,
but El-Kholy returned to Egypt full of praise for German music and musical
life in the GDR. In an article for al-Akhbar about the International Bach
Festival in Leipzig, which she also attended during her visit, she described
with admiration the reverence demonstrated in the city toward Western art
music. One of the “most beautiful features” of the Leipzig Opera House, she
observed, “is the way the public stands in very long queues in front of its
entrances, as refined music is spiritual nourishment for civilized peoples.”103
Okasha broached the topic of German opera for Egypt again a year later
when the RSO Leipzig visited Cairo. He met with Bork and asked that the
GDR support his desire to see Wagner’s operas in Egypt.104 The logistical
problems of staging Wagner in the Cairo Opera House remained insur-
mountable, but some compensation was provided in the conspicuous num-
ber of overtures by Wagner, Weber, and Beethoven that were performed in
Cairo that year by German orchestras. As can be seen in the Appendix, the
Dresdner Philharmonie included the overture to Der Freischütz in their
main program and offered as encores the overtures to Rienzi, Tannhäuser,
and Oberon, while the RSO Leipzig performed the prelude to Die Meister-
singer and the overture to Fidelio. The overture to Der fliegende Holländer
101. See MfAA A 12238, letter from Alfred Marter to the Egyptian Ministry for Culture
and National Guidance, September 23, 1959, 2.
102. See BArch DR 1/18876, vol. 3, “Abschlussbericht über den Aufenthalt der Gäste aus
der VAR: Aufenthaltsdauer: 24.5–5.6.1966,” June 22, 1966, 2.
103. Samha El-Kholy, “Ajmal Dar Ubira fi Uruba.. wa-Urkistra ‘Bayt al-Tarziyya’!” [The
most beautiful opera house in Europe . . . and the “House of Tailors” orchestra!], al-Akhbar, July
13, 1966: “Wa-min ajmal malamih hadhihi al-dar anna al-jumhur yaqif fi tawabir tawila jiddan
amam abwab al-dukhul, li-anna al-musiqa al-raqiyya, ghidha’ ruhi li-l-shu‘ub al-mutahaddira.”
104. See MfAA B 1003/69, Kurt Walter, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise in den Libanon,”
11–12.
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was also notably included by Wiesenhütter in the concert that is the subject
of the photographs shown in Figures 1–3.105
While Wagner productions remained out of reach, the plan to stage
German opera in Egypt finally came to fruition under the auspices of the
year-long festival of international culture that was organized to celebrate the
millennium of Cairo in 1969. The Egyptian Ministry for Culture invited
twenty “friendly countries” to send ensembles and exhibitions to showcase
their national cultural achievements as a gift to the Egyptian people,106 and
explicitly requested that the Deutsche Staatsoper represent the GDR and per-
form the Egyptian premieres of Ariadne auf Naxos and Così fan tutte.107
This generated vast amounts of positive publicity: Winter reported to the
GDR Ministry for Culture shortly after the visit that forty-two articles on the
company had appeared in the Egyptian daily press, with further coverage in
weekly newspapers and on the radio.108 A performance of Così fan tutte was
also broadcast on Egyptian national television together with an interview
with the Staatsoper’s intendant Hans Pischner, in which he extolled the gov-
ernment support provided for opera in the GDR.109
For both the Egyptians and the East Germans, the significance of the
Deutsche Staatsoper’s visit and the wider festival of which it was a part went
far beyond the performances themselves. From the Egyptian perspective, the
country’s ability to host such a large-scale international event involving a
lineup of world-leading ensembles was an impressive statement of defiance
in the wake of its recent defeat in the Six-DayWar, and was perceived as such
in many quarters. The New York Times notably declared that “[t]his is not,
perhaps, the best time for birthday parties,” and opined that “for the capital
of a nation shamed by its recent past and desperately anxious about the im-
mediate future, this is surely a gesture on a grand scale.”110 For the GDR
meanwhile, the opportunity for the Staatsoper to perform alongside ensem-
bles such as the Bolshoi Ballet and London’s Royal Ballet at a festival on
which the world’s eyes were trained was a significant coup. It was not only an
affirmation of the state’s ability to hold its own in artistic terms on an interna-
tional stage. More importantly, the designation of the GDR as a “friendly
105. See Mahmud Khattab, “al-Layla Yaqud Nihaytar al-Urkistra al-Simfuni” [Tonight
Wiesenhütter conducts the Symphony Orchestra], al-Jumhuriyya, October 7, 1967.
106. See Wahba, Cultural Policy in Egypt, 51.
107. See MfAA C 1233/70, letter from Horst Winter to Kurt Walter, January 16, 1968, 1,
and letter from Magdi Wahba to Horst Winter, May 14, 196[8] (the latter is dated 1969 but
given the contents was clearly written in 1968). Wahba initially requested that Bertolt Brecht
and Kurt Weill’s Die sieben Todsünden der Kleinbürger be performed, too, but the Staatsoper
ultimately decided against it.
108. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 3, Horst Winter, “Bericht über den Aufenthalt der
Deutschen Staatsoper Berlin in der VAR vom 1.3.1969–12.3.1969,” April 3, 1969, 1.
109. See ibid.
110. Anthony Carthew, “Cairo’s ‘Blue Period,’” New York Times, August 17, 1969, SM6.
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country” and the absence from the festival of anyWest German ensemble was
a clear indicator of the state’s growing political acceptability.
The Economics of Music Diplomacy
One of the most distinctive features of the relationships that evolved be-
tween Soviet Bloc and nonaligned states is the extent to which the balance
of power did not reinscribe the usual inequalities between the global north
and south. The cultural capital that the GDR possessed did not equate to
political capital. As a result, any progress that it achieved in the Middle East
on the back of music diplomacy was hard won. While the Egyptians certainly
looked to the GDR both for assistance in their quest to modernize and for
support against Israel, they were far from beholden to the East German
state; on the contrary, as Gray observes, the GDR’s precarious political status
cast it in the role of “petitioner.”111 This position is reflected in the negotia-
tions that surrounded the implementation of cultural diplomacy. Danielle
Fosler-Lussier describes the way in which music diplomacy was deployed by
the superpowers in third-party countries as a form of “gift economy,” which
“defined social and power relationships among nations.”112 The GDR cer-
tainly framed some of its activities in the Middle East in terms of gift giving.
The RSO Leipzig donated the income from the first of its Cairo concerts to
the war effort,113 and, as described above, the visit by the Deutsche Staats-
oper to Cairo was a gift in a literal sense, albeit one that was partly funded
by the Egyptian state. Gifts by their nature demand reciprocity, and, as Aafke
Komter observes, an “aspect of the principle of reciprocity is its implicit as-
sumption of the recognition of the other person as a potential ally.”114 The
GDR, unlike the superpowers, did not have the financial resources to fund
large-scale gifts in their entirety. Instead, in its dealings with nonaligned
states it enacted this principle of reciprocity by engaging in a model of eco-
nomic cooperation that took the form of trade “in the mutual interest,” or,
as Berthold Unfried aptly terms it, “aid by trade.”115 The GDR’s commit-
ment to international solidarity rarely translated into donations of goods or
experts. It expected nonaligned states to pay for commodities, either at sub-
sidized rates or through barter. The export of music to the Middle East
worked very much along these lines. In providing visiting ensembles, and
deploying experts to develop the musical cultures of Egypt and Syria, the
GDR was supplying a wanted resource at preferential rates. As in many such
111. Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 4.
112. Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 26.
113. See Darwish, “Na’ib Wazir al-Thaqafa al-Almani Yaqul.”
114. Komter, “Gifts and Social Relations,” 102.
115. See Unfried, “Friendship and Education,” 18.
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subsidized trade deals, however, haggling was often required. East German
officials had to work to assert a musical presence for the GDR in the region.
The financial negotiations that surrounded visits by East German ensem-
bles are illuminating in this context. All musical activities between Egypt and
the GDR came under the auspices of the Joint Cultural Commission GDR-
UAR (Die gemeinsame Kulturkommission DDR-VAR), which was set up
following the signing by the two states of the Agreement on Cultural and
Scientific Cooperation in March 1965. The terms of the commission stipu-
lated that the costs incurred by visiting delegations, exhibitions, and experts
would be defrayed according to a “principle of reciprocity,” whereby inter-
national travel expenses would be borne by the sending party, and subsis-
tence and internal travel costs by the receiving party.116 Things rarely
worked like this in practice, however, and the GDR was frequently obliged
to supplement shortfalls on the Egyptian side in order for tours to proceed.
The 1967 visit by the Dresdner Philharmonie is a case in point. The tour
was first mooted in an addendum to the Joint Cultural Commission’s “Cul-
ture Plan” for 1965–66 and given the go-ahead at the commission’s annual
assembly, which took place in Cairo in July 1966.117 In the weeks that fol-
lowed, however, the Egyptian side began to waver. On August 7, Horst
Winter wrote to the Deutsche Künstler-Agentur (German Artists Agency,
DKA), the body charged with securing contracts for foreign guest perfor-
mances by East German musicians and ensembles, noting that the Egyptian
Ministry for Culture had yet to approve the tour officially, and surmising
that it could well happen “that the UAR side turns to us to ask for financial
support for the visit.”118 No such request was forthcoming. Yet when the
Egyptian Ministry for Culture gave the green light for the concerts in Octo-
ber and issued its terms, it was clear that the GDR would have to provide
a substantial subsidy to cover costs. The fees for the performances—800
Egyptian pounds for each of the three Cairo concerts and no honorarium
whatsoever for the concert in Alexandria—were lower than anticipated; it
was uncertain whether the Egyptian side would cover the orchestra’s travel
costs between Cairo and Alexandria; and the proposed blanket per diem for
rank-and-file musicians, soloists, and conductor alike was inadequate. As the
116. See MfAA A 13859, “Direktive für die Delegation der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik zu den Verhandlungen der ‘Gemeinsamen Kulturkommission Deutsche Demokrati-
sche Republik—Vereinigte Arabische Republik’ in der DDR,” [1966], 4.
117. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 1, “Direktive für eine Reise des Direktors der Deut-
schen Künstler-Agentur, Günther Weber, zu Verhandlungen in der VAR, Libanon und Syrien,”
prepared on behalf of Irene Gysi, Head of the Department of International Relations, Ministry
for Culture.
118. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 1, letter from Horst Winter to Günther Weber, DKA,
August 7, 1966, 2: “daß die VAR-Seite sich an uns wendet und um finanzielle Unterstützung
für den Aufenthalt bittet.” The DKA changed its name in 1968 to Künstler-Agentur der DDR.
For clarity, I refer to it using the acronym DKA throughout.
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director of the DKA, Ernst Zielke, pointed out to the Ministry for Culture,
it was out of the question “that Professor Bongartz would travel to Egypt for
three [Egyptian pounds] a day.”119
The ensuing conversations on the GDR side demonstrate the tensions
that often existed between the various East German government bodies re-
sponsible for implementing foreign policy strategy. The DKA was concerned
primarily with economic viability. Accordingly, it recommended that the tour
should not proceed on these terms, explaining, “We do not consider the po-
tential cultural-political gains of the tour to be such as would justify the finan-
cial risk and loss of hard currency.”120 The DKA was overruled by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, who saw the tour as a vital means of
developing GDR-Egyptian cultural relations. Stressing “the need to do ev-
erything possible to facilitate the appearance of the Dresdner Philharmonie in
the United Arab Republic,”121 it ultimately ordered the Ministry for Culture
to subsidize any shortfall on the Egyptian side to the value of 2,000 Egyptian
pounds.122 Thus, the tour went ahead. This was a pattern that was to occur
repeatedly, and one that the East Germans were generally prepared to toler-
ate, as the political benefits associated with performances by elite ensembles
abroad were thought to outweigh any financial losses. In the case of the
Deutsche Staatsoper’s Cairo visit, for example, the DKA concluded to the
Ministry for Culture that “the great success of the guest appearance in cultur-
al and political spheres vindicates the extraordinarily high expenditure for the
visit and in my opinion also justifies the high financial costs in West German
marks, about which there were obviously certain doubts.”123
The GDR’s willingness to subsidize cultural activities did not result in
Arab nations accepting whatever was sent their way, however. The Egyp-
tian Ministry for Culture was wont to curtail the number of visiting en-
sembles proposed by the GDR in the annual plans of the Joint Cultural
Commission,124 and attempts to instigate cultural collaborations met with
119. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 1, letter from Ernst Zielke to Irene Gysi, November 29,
1966, 2: “daß Herr Professor Bongartz nicht für 3.- pro Tag nach Ägypten reisen wird.”
120. Ibid.: “Wir halten den möglichen kulturpolitischen Nutzen für nicht so hoch, als daß
damit gerechtfertigt wäre, ein derartiges finanzielles Risiko und Valutaverlust einzugehen.”
“Valuta” was the term used in the GDR to refer to hard currency (usually West German marks).
121. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 1, letter from Christian Fichte to Irene Gysi, December 5,
1966, 2: “die Notwendigkeit, alles zu tun, damit das Auftreten der Dresdner Philharmonie in
der Vereinigten Arabischen Republik möglich wird.”
122. See ibid., 1.
123. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 3, Gerhard Heinemann, “Bericht über das Gastspiel der
Deutschen Staatsoper Berlin in Kairo/VAR vom 3. bis 12. März 1969,” April 25, 1969, 3: “Der
große Erfolg des Gastspiels auf künstlerischem und politischem Gebiet bestätigt die Richtigkeit
des außergewöhnlich hohen Aufwandes für das Gastspiel und rechtfertigt meines Erachtens auch
die hohen finanziellen Ausgaben in Mark, über die es offensichtlich gewisse Zweifel gab.”
124. See, for example,MfAAC 657, “Bericht über die 3. Tagung der ‘GemeinsamenKultur-
kommission DDR-VAR,’” [1967], 3.
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variable responses. The GDR’s State Broadcasting Committee struggled, for
example, to engage Radio Cairo in an exchange of materials. In 1965, they
sent over twelve hours of taped music programming for broadcast on Radio
Cairo, which went unacknowledged. They also received no response to re-
quests that the Egyptians send music for East German children’s choirs to
perform and scores of symphonic works by Egyptian composers to be re-
corded for broadcasting in the GDR.125
The varying degrees of enthusiasm with which the GDR’s endeavors
were greeted can be ascribed to a number of factors. First and foremost,
Western art music, while certainly valued by those in power, was simply not
as much of a priority for Arab nations as it was for the GDR. This was par-
ticularly the case at a time of escalating tensions with Israel, as Bork discov-
ered when meeting the Syrian Minister for Culture, Zuheir Akkad, after the
RSO Leipzig’s concert in Damascus. On the back of the performance, Bork
offered further cultural support to the Syrian state, volunteering, among
other things, to send instrumental teachers and a film director to Damascus
and to fund a residency for a Syrian theater director at the Berliner Ensem-
ble. Akkad reportedly responded that “Syria gratefully acknowledges every
act of solidarity,” but also that “the Syrian government would be particularly
appreciative of military support” in the battle against Israel.126
It was also the case that the GDR was attempting to enter a market in
which other countries, Soviet Bloc states in particular, already had a sizable
stake. This being so, it sometimes happened that what the GDR had to offer
was simply not competitive. Zielke’s attempts on behalf of the DKA to orga-
nize a second tour in the Middle East for the Dresdner Philharmonie in
1968, for example, were not received favorably. The Egyptians, Zielke re-
ported, conceded that they might consider another concert if the orchestra
was already on tour in the region but were otherwise prepared to host only
elite ensembles such as the Gewandhausorchester or the Staatskapelle Dres-
den.127 The Baalbeck Festival committee, meanwhile, declined the Dresdner
Philharmonie on the grounds that it had already performed in Beirut and
thus would not be novel enough for the festival’s audience. The committee
did express an interest in engaging the Gewandhausorchester for the 1969
festival.128 There was, however, a catch, in that the Moscow Philharmonic
125. See MfAA A 17032, “Bericht über die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Rundfunk der Ver-
einigten Arabischen Republik im Jahre 1965,” February 10, 1966, 1–2.
126. See MfAA B 1003/69, Kurt Walter, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise in den Libanon,”
8: “daß Syrien jede Solidaritätsaktion dankbar anerkenne, daß die syrische Regierung aber be-
sonders dankbar für militärische Unterstützung sei.”
127. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 3, Ernst Zielke, “Bericht über die Ergebnisse der
Dienstreise in die VAR und den Libanon vom 23. September bis 30. September 1968,” Octo-
ber 3, 1968, 5.
128. Ibid., 9. The festival committee notably had the Berliner Philharmoniker under Her-
bert von Karajan lined up for 1968.
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Orchestra had already been contracted for the event. Consequently, the com-
mittee agreed to host the Gewandhaus only on condition that the DKA con-
vince the Moscow Philharmonic to withdraw. Zielke accordingly pleaded the
Gewandhaus’s case with his counterpart at Goskontsert, the USSR’s State
Concert Agency, citing the event’s exceptional importance given that it
would coincide with the GDR’s twentieth anniversary.129 On this occasion
the Soviets were prepared to make way. Zielke secured two dates for the
Gewandhaus at the 1969 festival. His attempts to expand these dates into a
regional tour failed, however, as Egypt declined to host the orchestra.130
At other times, the presence of the USSR and other Soviet Bloc members
proved more of a challenge. This was particularly true of the GDR’s at-
tempts to populate the Western art music scene in Cairo with East Ger-
man experts. The sending of experts was a strategy employed extensively
by countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. The
deployment of health workers, engineers, teachers, arts and culture special-
ists, lawyers, government advisors, and military specialists to nonaligned
states was viewed as an effective means of fostering allegiances, influencing
policy, and spreading ideology.131 The USSR granted Eastern Bloc states
considerable autonomy in this regard. As long as their activities did not con-
travene Soviet foreign policy, they were essentially free to further their own
interests. Czechoslovakia, for example, operated with remarkable indepen-
dence in Egypt throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It signed a crucial arms
deal with Nasser in 1955, founded Egypt’s first military college in 1958, and
supplied the teaching staff for the college until 1960.132 The country also
played a vital role in keeping the Cairo Symphony Orchestra afloat through-
out the 1960s: Czechoslovakian players, who were apparently offered by
their government at very reasonable rates, made up almost a third of the or-
chestra in 1967.133
129. See ibid., 10.
130. See MfAA C 1354/76, “Bericht der Delegation der DDR in der ‘Gemeinsamen Kul-
turkommission DDR-VAR’ über den Stand der Erfüllung des Arbeitsplanes für kulturelle und
wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der VAR für die Jahre 1969 und
1970 mit dem Stand Ende November 1969,” 5. No reasons are given. The report simply states,
“The visit of the Gewandhausorchester Leipzig in August was not accepted by the UAR” (“Der
Aufenthalt des Leipziger Gewandhausorchesters im August wurde von der VAR nicht akzep-
tiert”).
131. See Hong, Cold War Germany, 13–48. For a discussion of the American Specialists
program, see Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 47–76.
132. See Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in Africa, 94.
133. A report from 1967 gives the demographic makeup of the orchestra’s ninety-six mem-
bers as follows: thirty-nine Egyptian musicians, thirty-one Czechoslovakian, fourteen Bulgarian,
three Yugoslavian, three Italian, two Polish, two Greek, one French, and one Ghanaian; see
BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Werner Rackwitz, November 9,
1967, 1.
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From the GDR’s perspective, the long leash granted by the USSR was
conducive to its bid to assert independence, and by 1967 the state had de-
ployed almost 300 experts to the Middle East.134 East German advisors re-
ceived a particularly warm welcome in Syria, where they helped to shape the
emerging policies of the new Ba’ath government.135 The lack of top-down
Soviet control, however, also meant that the GDR found itself having to
compete with allies for opportunities.136 Despite repeated efforts, it strug-
gled, for example, to break the Soviet monopoly on the Cairo Conservatory.
In 1965, the Egyptian Ministry for Culture rebuffed the GDR’s offer of a
singing teacher, a violin teacher, and a teacher of harmony, aural skills, and
music history, citing sufficient cover in these areas.137 When the Egyptians
expressed a wish for a teacher of organ and composition, the East Germans
tried to secure the post for Leipzig-based organist Lorenz Stolzenbach, but
extensive negotiations, which began in April 1966 and lasted over a year,
came to nothing. The Egyptian Ministry for Culture rejected the GDR’s ini-
tial offer, countering that the Soviets provided better financial terms where
the sending of specialists was concerned.138 Subsequently, when a contract
with Stolzenbach appeared to have been secured, the Egyptians gave the po-
sition at the last minute to a Yugoslavian organist.139 Similarly fruitless was
the GDR’s proposal of the Schwerin conductor Werner Schöniger for the
rectorship of the conservatory, which became vacant in the spring of
1967.140 Schöniger was overlooked in favor of a Soviet candidate, who upon
his appointment brought with him a further ten teachers from the USSR,
leading Winter to conclude that, “with eleven posts in the conservatory
occupied by Soviet experts, the question of teachers from the GDR is
finished.”141
134. See Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel, 62.
135. See ibid., 61, and Trentin, “Modernization as State Building,” 500–504.
136. The GDR was not unique in this respect. Hilger details, for example, the competition
between the USSR and Czechoslovakia for the tractor market in India, in which Czechoslovakia
notably had the upper hand: Hilger, “Revolutionsideologie, Systemkonkurrenz,” 406.
137. See MfAA A 13859, “Bericht der Delegation der Deutschen Demokratischen Re-
publik in der ‘Gemeinsamen Kulturkommission DDR-VAR’ über den Stand der Erfüllung
des ‘Arbeitsplanes der kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Vereinigten Arabischen Republik für die Jahre
1965 und 1966’ mit dem Stand vom 31. März 1966,” 10.
138. See MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Rudolf Greiser, Department of
International Relations, Ministry for Culture, January 12, 1967, 2.
139. See MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Christian Fichte, consulate general, to Rudolf Grei-
ser, May 30, 1967, 2.
140. See MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Kurt Walter, Department of
International Relations, Ministry for Culture, March 20, 1967, 2.
141. MfAA C 657, letter from Horst Winter to Rudolf Greiser, August 2, 1967, 7: “Wir
schätzen ein, daß mit der Besetzung von 11 Stellen im Konservatorium durch sowjetische
Experten die Frage nach Lehrkräften aus der DDR gesunken ist.”
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Perspectives from the Ground
The GDR finally managed to secure a prestigious musical post in Egypt for
one of its citizens in the summer of 1967. Impressed by the visit of the
Dresdner Philharmonie and in anticipation of the impending RSO Leipzig
tour, the Egyptian Ministry for Culture approached the East German con-
sulate about the possibility of engaging an East German conductor to direct
the Cairo Symphony Orchestra.142 The GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs
proposed Gerhart Wiesenhütter, conductor of the Loh-Orchester in Son-
derhausen, and on this occasion their offer was accepted. Wiesenhütter trav-
eled to Cairo in September 1967 to take up his new post. His appointment
was a significant triumph in terms of raising the GDR’s international profile,
and was noted warily in West Germany as evidence of a growing alliance be-
tween the GDR and Arab nations. Der Spiegel reported in 1968 on the sud-
den surge in cultural exchange, noting of recent events that “in Cairo the
GDR Kapellmeister Gerhart Wiesenhütter kept Egypt’s Symphony Orches-
tra in time. In Leipzig, meanwhile, the Egyptian singer Ratiba El-Hefny
warbled German arias.”143 The article continued with a long list of cultural
and sporting collaborations between the GDR and the Middle East, includ-
ing the appointment of an East German sports doctor to the Egyptian team
at theMexicanOlympics, and concluded that “for Egyptians, Iraqis, and Syr-
ians, Germany’s capital is now East Berlin.”144 Outward appearances were
often deceptive, however, and the public manifestations of cultural solidarity
that were drawing the attention of the FRG were not necessarily replicated
on the ground. In the case of Wiesenhütter, while the act of his appointment
was rightly counted by the GDR as a success, his tenure with the Cairo Sym-
phony Orchestra was anything but. He struggled to negotiate the politics in-
volved with the post, and his one-year contract, which the Egyptians had
initially planned to extend for a further two years, was terminated after only
seven months.
This episode illustrates the different ways in which success can be mea-
sured where international diplomacy is concerned. It also illuminates some
of the more problematic aspects of East German attitudes toward the Mid-
dle East. The GDR’s public commitment to Khrushchev’s interventionist in-
ternational policy and its fluid constructs of social development coexisted
142. See MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Irene Gysi, July 25, 1967.
143. “DDR: El-Safara el-Almania,” Der Spiegel, November 11, 1968, http://www.spiegel
.de/spiegel/print/d-45922030.html: “In Kairo brachte DDR-Kapellmeister Gerhart Wiesen-
hütter Ägyptens Symphoniker in Takt. In Leipzig trällerte derweil die ägyptische Sängerin Ratiba
el-Hefni [sic] deutsche Arien.” The title of the article (“GDR: German Embassy”) refers to the fact
that taxi drivers in Damascus, when directed to the “German embassy,”were apparently taking pas-
sengers to the East German consulate rather than the West German embassy.
144. Ibid.: “ist für Ägypter, Iraker und Syrer Deutschlands Hauptstadt heute Ost-Berlin.”
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with a much more static perception of socialist evolution, one shaped by the
legacy of colonialism rather than by Marxist ideology. As Gregory Witkow-
ski argues, East Germans, despite their support for anti-imperial solidarity,
“continued to define themselves in a national and racial hierarchy in juxtapo-
sition to the developing world.”145 Thus, for example, East German officials
deemed the Western-orientated Lebanese to stand apart from the other
Arab nations in terms of their capacity to appreciate the finer points of West-
ern culture. The Ministry for Foreign affairs counseled in 1963 that “it must
be taken into consideration that, with regard to its high cultural standards,
Lebanon is not to be compared with the other Arab nations. It is therefore
essential to ensure that only top performers and artistic work of the highest
standard be sent there.”146 Conversely, the unofficial GDR consulate gener-
al in Syria ascribed the success there of the Erich-Weinert-Ensemble in 1968
to the “Arabic mentality for exhibition, turbulence, color, etc.”147
Assumptions about what Arab nations might be prepared to accept in
terms of Western culture represented the GDR’s first error where Wiesen-
hütter was concerned. The Egyptians had set their sights high in their search
for a conductor. When Magdi Wahba, Samha El-Kholy, and the manager of
the orchestra, Rashad Badran, met withHorstWinter to discuss thematter in
July 1967, they requested “a very experienced and artistically highly qualified
person,” and suggested Herbert Kegel of the RSO Leipzig for the posi-
tion.148 Wiesenhütter had a reasonable pedigree, having briefly led both the
RSO Leipzig and the Dresdner Philharmonie after the war. His current po-
sition as director of the Loh-Orchester, which he had held since 1959, did
not, however, match the international profile that the Egyptians had in mind,
and he struggled from the outset to exert his authority.149 His appointment
provoked resentment among the Egyptian conductors who had to work
under him for considerably less money,150 and was viewed unfavorably by
145. Witkowski, “Between Fighters and Beggars,” 73. On the wider question of race in the
GDR, see Piesche, “Black and German?”
146. MfAA B 3016, Norbert Jaeschke, “Kulturelle Beziehungen im Jahre 1964,” 9: “Es ist
zu beachten, daß der Libanon hinsichtlich des hohen Kulturniveaus keineswegs mit den anderen
arabischen Ländern zu vergleichen ist. Es ist daher darauf zu achten, daß nach dem Libanon nur
Spitzenkräfte und künstlerische Arbeiten mit höchstem Niveau entsandt werden können.”
147. MfAA C 52973, “Bericht über die Ergebnisse und Probleme der kulturellen und wis-
senschaftlichen Auslandsbeziehungen der DDR zur SAR im Jahre 1968,” December 22, 1968,
7: “der arabischen Mentalität zu Schaubedürfnis, Turbulenz, Farbenpracht usw.” The tendency
to refer to an Arabic or oriental “mentality” extended far beyond matters of culture. See, for ex-
ample, Pence’s discussion of similar remarks made in the context of industrial exhibitions in
Cairo in the 1950s: Pence, “Showcasing Cold War Germany,” 82–83.
148. MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Irene Gysi, July 25, 1967, 1: “einen
sehr erfahrenen und künstlerisch hochqualifizerten Mann.”
149. See Burchartz, “Wiesenhütter, Gerhart Wilhelm Robert.”
150. See MfAA C 1234/70, “Information zur bevorstehenden Ablösung des General-
musikdirektors Wiesenhütter,”May 12, 1968, 1–2. Winter reports in this brief (2) that Ahmed
Ebeid was paid 110 LE (Egyptian pounds) a month and Youssef El-Sisi only 60 LE a month.
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certain factions in the Egyptian Ministry for Culture. Ratiba El-Hefny, re-
porting to Winter in her capacity as a member of the ministry’s music com-
mittee, relayed that Wiesenhütter’s work was not well regarded there,
commenting that “this was not surprising, given that the GDR had sent
a conductor who wasn’t as good as had been expected.”151
Wiesenhütter’s musical credentials were not the only problem. In an inter-
view with Neue Zeit to mark his departure to Cairo, he dutifully declared his
new appointment to be “an expression of solidarity by the socialist countries
for the UAR in the construction of its culture.”152 In fact, his motivations
were less high-minded. He had come to the attention of the SED as a result
of a letter he had sent to SED Politbüro member Paul Verner in July 1967,
bemoaning his position with the Loh-Orchester and asking that he be as-
signed to an elite orchestra that better befitted his talents.153 Consequently,
as was often true of such postings, he appears to have accepted the job in
Cairo purely in the hopes of advancing his career, likely having been prom-
ised a more illustrious position in the GDR upon his return. He was not,
however, terribly well suited to the role: unable to accept the Egyptians on
their own terms, he struggled to deal with the working conditions there. The
practical challenges he faced were, it must be said, significant at times. He
spoke only German and the interpreter who had been promised by the Egyp-
tian Ministry for Culture failed to materialize. As a result, he was obliged to
communicate with the orchestra via the Egyptian conductor Youssef El-Sisi,
who had trained in Vienna and, according toWinter, used the opportunity to
inject his own musical opinions into Wiesenhütter’s commands.154 The or-
chestra’s library was also seriously understocked, such that Wiesenhütter had
to source scores from the GDR in order to ensure a varied program.155 And
the circumstances in which he was forced to lead rehearsals were trying. This
was particularly the case once the ballet and opera season began in January
1968 and the orchestra was divided into two ensembles—a chamber orches-
tra, which fell under Wiesenhütter’s remit, and a separate orchestra for the
ballet and opera. They rehearsed at the same time in the Cairo Opera House,
Wiesenhütter, by comparison, was paid in the region of 300 LE a month. On Wiesenhütter’s
salary, see MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Rudolf Greiser to Borowski, Ministry for Foreign
Trade, August 21, 1967.
151. MfAA C 1234/70, “Information zur bevorstehenden Ablösung des Generalmusik-
direktors Wiesenhütter,” 3: “daß das ja nicht verwunderlich sei, da die DDR ja einen nicht
so guten Dirigenten, wie erwartet, hergeschichkt habe.”
152. “Diplomat mit Dirigentenstab: NZ-Interview mit Gerhart Wiesenhütter über seine
Berufung nach Kairo,” Neue Zeit, September 29, 1967, 4: “als Ausdruck solidarischer Hilfe der
sozialistischen Länder für die VAR beim Aufbau ihrer Kultur.”
153. See BArch DR 1/27073, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Paul Verner, July 5,
1967.
154. See MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Irene Gysi, October 25, 1967, 2.
155. See ibid., 3, and BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Kurt
Bork, undated but stamped as received by the Ministry for Culture on March 14, 1968, 4.
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and Wiesenhütter was assigned a room that was too small to accommodate
all thirty-four musicians of his ensemble at once, so that he was forced to re-
hearse the sections separately.156
In addition to the practical difficulties, Wiesenhütter struggled to get on
with Badran, the orchestra manager, who, he reported, regularly under-
mined his decisions, changing the content of programs without consulting
him and supplying soloists only for the concerts directed by the Egyptian
conductors.157 Badran, who had expressed reservations about Wiesenhüt-
ter’s appointment from the outset, does seem to have made life difficult for
him. The consulate ascribed Badran’s behavior to his purported allegiances
with the West,158 a line of argument Wiesenhütter similarly employed in or-
der to explain the negative reception accorded to him in other quarters.159
Yet Wiesenhütter’s low opinion of the Egyptians he was supposed to be as-
sisting in the spirit of solidarity cannot have helped his situation. In a letter
outlining his grievances written to Bork in the spring of 1968, he com-
plained, “That’s the Egyptians; on the one hand they are so in need of help,
on the other so cocky and unjust that they acknowledge well-intentioned
help with arrogance and kicks in the face.”160 Those working in the rarified
conditions of the consulate, he opined, were oblivious to the difficulties fac-
ing experts on the ground in Egypt. “The specialists, who are directly depen-
dent on Egyptians, all complain,” he noted, claiming that the situation was
worst for those involved in the arts: “My superiors are unstable Egyptians,
who through their behavior reveal huge sympathies with Western [i.e.,
non-Soviet-Bloc] countries. Egyptian musicians, who are always tired, form
the core stock on which I am artistically dependent. Two-thirds of my con-
cert audience are Egyptians. There is also the problem that the critics are for
sale, and that makes my work particularly difficult.”161 In stark contrast to
156. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Kurt Bork,
stamped March 14, 1968, 2–3.
157. See ibid., 4–5.
158. See MfAA B 1003/69, letter from Horst Winter to Irene Gysi, October 25, 1967, 3.
159. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Kurt Bork,
stamped March 14, 1968, 4.
160. Ibid.: “Das sind die Ägypter, auf der einen Seite sind sie so hilfsbedürftig, auf der an-
deren so anmassend und ungerecht, dass sie ehrlich gemeinte Hilfe mit Überheblichkeit und
Fusstritten quittieren.” Such perspectives were by no means unique among GDR experts. For
similar comments made by experts working elsewhere in Africa, see Unfried, “Friendship and
Education,” 28–29.
161. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Gerhart Wiesenhütter to Kurt Bork, stamped
March 14, 1968, 4: “Aber die Spezialisten, die unmittelbar auf Ägypter angewiesen sind, klagen
alle. . . . Meine Vorgesetzten sind labile Ägypter, die in ihrer Haltung grosse Sympathien für die
westlichen Länder zeigen. Ägyptische Musiker, die immer müde sind, bilden den Grundstock,
auf den ich künstlerisch angewiesen bin. 2/3 meines Konzertpublikums sind Ägypter. Dazu
kommt, dass die Kritiker käuflich sind, und das macht meine Arbeit besonders schwer.”
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the glowing reports of Egyptian audiences attributed to Otmar Suitner in
the GDR press following the Deutsche Staatsoper’s performances, Wiesen-
hütter deemed his audiences to be “not in a position to accurately assess per-
formances. The Egyptians are overjoyed if it’s really loud, they don’t grasp
the subtleties.”162
The chasm that existed between official narratives of solidarity and the
perceptions of the people involved in its implementation was not confined
to the situation in Egypt. The reception accorded to Ratiba El-Hefny in the
GDR exposes particularly clearly the tensions created at home by the SED’s
foreign policy. El-Hefny was one of the most prominent figures in Egyptian
musical life. She was the country’s preeminent opera singer, but also served
as dean of the Higher Institute for Arabic Music throughout the 1960s and,
crucially, had the ear of Tharwat Okasha.163 In the late 1960s she was writ-
ing a doctoral dissertation on Egyptian folk music at the Humboldt Univer-
sity and was eager to spend more time in Berlin, a request that the unofficial
consulate in Cairo recommended it would be prudent to facilitate.164 To
this end, the GDRMinistry for Culture created various opportunities for her
in 1968. These included a series of performances in small venues across East
Germany, and a concert for her and her husband, the conductor Ahmed
Ebeid, with the Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Berlin.165 Most notably, the
Ministry for Culture persuaded the intendant of the Deutsche Staatsoper,
Hans Pischner, to offer El-Hefny a guest performance: on January 12,
1968, she appeared as Gilda in a production of Rigoletto.166
While this strategy was effective in generating international publicity, as
witnessed by theDer Spiegel article cited above, it drew a cooler response on
the domestic front. The GDR’s opera critics were noticeably silent on El-
Hefny’s Staatsoper premiere, no reviews appearing in the usual venues. Ex-
tensive feedback was, however, provided by members of the Staatsoper,
which Pischner collated and sent to the Ministry for Culture.167 The most
162. Ibid.: “Das Publikum ist nicht in der Lage, Leistungen richtig zu beurteilen. Die
Ägypter sind begeistert, wenn es recht laut zugeht, die Feinheiten erfassen sie nicht.”
163. See Metwaly, “Life and Times of an Arab Soprano.”
164. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Horst Winter to Kurt Walter, August 20,
1967, 2.
165. See Ahmad ‘Abd al-Hamid, “Awwal Masriyya Tughanni fi Ubira Barlin” [First Egyptian
woman to sing at the Berlin Opera], al-Jumhuriyya, February 7, 1968; “Konzertgäste aus Kairo,”
Neue Zeit, January 14, 1968, 7; and BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, “Aktennotiz zum Aufenthalt des
Gastes: Frau Ratiba El Hefny,” August 20, 1968.
166. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Irene Gysi to Hans Pischner, May 24,
1967.
167. See BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Hans Pischner to Irene Gysi, February 6,
1968, and accompanying “Anlage: Abschrift der Urteile über das Auftreten der Sängerin Ratiba
El-Hefny in der Partie der Gilda in der Oper ‘Rigoletto’ am 12. Januar 1968 in der Deutschen
Staatsoper Berlin.”
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positive comment described El-Hefny as having a “fine, but not outstanding
voice.”168 Other responses were less charitable. The director Werner Stolze,
for example, observed that “Frau El-Hefny must have been very nervous—
otherwise I can’t explain such an absence of musicality.”169 Feedback on her
stage presence, or the lack of it, was particularly harsh, attracting comments
such as “boring and colorless” and “very pallid. No personality on the
stage.”170 Pischner also forwarded to the ministry a letter from a regular au-
dience member, Ilse Richter, which denounced El-Hefny’s performance as a
“fiasco,” complaining that “the singer stood rigidly on the stage like a doll—
almost without any external movement, as if indifferent to all events.”171
Although El-Hefny had studied singing in Munich, she had little familiarity
with the emphasis on staging in East German opera production, and was
likely not equipped to appear at the Staatsoper with minimal preparation,
having made herself available for rehearsal only three days prior to the per-
formance.172 The reflections of Arthur Apelt, the Staatsoper’s general mu-
sic director, were to the point in this regard: “Not experienced enough for
guest performances at the Staatsoper. Should ‘learn to walk’ first in the
provinces.”173
It was also the case, however, that, for some, El-Hefny represented an un-
desirable other. Ilse Richter notably described her as a “foreign body”
(“Fremdkörper”), a term that had accrued pointed pejorative connotations
in twentieth-century German discourse.174 El-Hefny, Richter complained,
was a “foreign body in a perfectly harmonized community—the ensemble.”
This, she continued, was something she had never before observed of a
guest performer: “on the contrary—I’m thinking especially of the different
Soviet singers who have performed Amneris here, of [the German singer]
Ruth-Margret Pütz in Rosenkavalier, and many others.”175
168. Ibid., “Anlage,” 1: “Schöne, aber nicht überdurchschnittliche Stimme.”
169. Ibid.: “Frau El Hefny muß sehr nervös gewesen sein—anders kann ich mir soviel Un-
musikalität nicht erklären.”
170. Ibid.: “langweilig und farblos”; “Sehr blass. Auf der Bühne keine Persönlichkeit.”
171. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Ilse Richter to Hans Pischner, January 17,
1968: “Die Sängerin stand steif wie ein Puppe—fast ohne jede äußere Regung, wie unbeteiligt
an allen Vorgängen—auf der Bühne.”
172. See Margrit Steger, “Bericht über die Proben mit Frau El Hefny, January 15, 1968,”
included in BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Hans Pischner to Irene Gysi, February 6,
1968.
173. Ibid., “Anlage,” 2: “Für Gastspiele an der Staatsoper noch nicht erfahren genug.
Müsste erst in der Provinz ‘laufen lernen.’”
174. See, for example, Neumann, “Phenomenology of the German People’s Body.”
175. BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 2, letter from Ilse Richter to Hans Pischner, January 17,
1968: “Fremdkörper in einer tadellos aufeinander abgestimmten Gemeinschaft—dem Ensem-
ble”; “im Gegenteil—ich denke da an verschieden sowj. Sängerinnen, die als Amneris hier gas-
tierten, an Ruth-Margret Pütz im ‘Rosenkavalier’ u. viele andere.”
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Conclusion
Following the tours of the Deutsche Staatsoper and the Gewandhaus-
orchester in 1969, the GDR’s musical program in the Middle East lost its
intensity. East German artists continued to perform in the region into the
1970s, and further attempts were made by East German officials to secure
concert dates for East German ensembles in Egypt and Lebanon.176 Yet
the last performance by an East German orchestral ensemble in Cairo was
that by the Kammerorchester des Berliner Rundfunks in 1970, while the
final such performance in Beirut was given by the Bach Orchester of the
Gewandhaus in December 1971. The most obvious explanation for this
turn of events was the sudden movement on the question of diplomatic
recognition. The impasse on this front was breached unexpectedly on
April 30, 1969, when Iraq announced its decision to initiate diplomatic
relations with the East German state. Cambodia followed suit in May, and
over the next few months Sudan, Syria, and Egypt all recognized the
GDR. This wave of acceptance signaled the beginning of the end for the
Hallstein Doctrine. Unwilling to grant the GDR free rein in the increasing
number of countries that were prepared to defy the Doctrine, the FRG
began to relent its hardline stance, and in 1972 it abandoned the Doctrine
altogether, enabling states across the world to recognize the GDR with-
out the risk of repercussions.177
With normal diplomatic channels increasingly available, music diplomacy
lost its importance, and the escalating costs of sending artists to perform in
the Middle East became unpalatable.178 Other factors also conspired to cur-
tail the GDR’s musical activities, chief among them being the sudden death
of Nasser in September 1970. Nasser’s successor in Egypt, Anwar Sadat, was
far less well-disposed toward the Soviet Bloc. He expelled more than 10,000
Soviet military experts from Egypt in 1972,179 and in 1977 closed numerous
Eastern European consulates and cultural centers—including the GDR con-
sulate in Alexandria and the GDR cultural centers in Cairo and Alexandria—
in response to Soviet disapproval at his rapprochement with Israel.180 The
breakdown of cultural ties that accompanied the collapse of political rela-
tions with the Soviet Bloc reflects the wider shift away from the Western
176. The possibility was explored, for example, of sending the Dresden Staatskapelle to the
Baalbeck Festival in 1974 but it came to nothing; see MfAA C 7573, letter from Müller to Her-
mann Falk, DKA, April 9, 1974.
177. On the West German perspective, see Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 217–19.
178. See, for example, MfAA B 1304/76, “Bemerkungen zum Erfüllungsstand des Arbeits-
planes I/1970 für die Sektion Kultur,” June 26, 1970, 3.
179. See Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, 469.
180. See Winrow, Foreign Policy of the GDR, 102.
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ideals of modernity that had dominated the aspirations of Arab nations in
the 1950s and 1960s.181 Writing of Syria, Shannon explains that the coun-
try’s defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 “dispelled the optimism about mod-
ernization that characterized the early post-Independence era,” and
“encouraged calls for a renewal of Arab culture from the ‘slumbering’ and
decadence into which it had fallen—this time because of an over-reliance
on Western conceptions of culture and society.”182 In the case of Egypt,
El-Shawan notes that “policy makers, producers, musicians and audiences
were all affected by the questioning of Western values and influence and the
search for a new Egyptian national identity during the 1970s.”183 Funding
for foreign performances dried up and the Cairo Symphony Orchestra tem-
porarily disbanded over the course of the early 1970s.184 In this climate,
there was little scope for the GDR to exert any cultural influence. Reporting
in 1974, the GDR embassy in Cairo offered a glum overview of the current
state of cultural relations between the two countries and predicted that “it is
to be expected that the operating conditions of the collaboration with the
Ministry for Culture will deteriorate further.”185 Meanwhile, the onset of
civil war in Lebanon in 1975 put an end to any GDR cultural presence there.
The efficacy of cultural diplomacy is notoriously difficult to assess. Nu-
merous factors contributed to the defeat of the Hallstein Doctrine, and
despite the GDR’s own foreign policy initiatives, many of the events that
culminated in its achieving international diplomatic recognition took place
outside its sphere of control. Iraq’s unexpected offer of diplomatic relations
was in exchange for increased Soviet support,186 and Nasser appears to have
been likewise swayed, as Gray observes, by “Soviet pressure in conjunction
with a pending arms sale.”187 It was also the case that the acquisition of dip-
lomatic recognition ultimately involved parting with large amounts of hard
currency. The GDR paid over $84 million to Iraq in exchange for diplomat-
ic relations and $50 million to Syria.188 The role that cultural diplomacy
played in this process should not, however, be underestimated. The relation-
ships that evolved through music and other forms of cultural exchange ini-
tiated by the GDR undoubtedly helped to create conditions that were
conducive to political deals being struck. Joseph Nye has observed of soft
181. Chakrabarty observes the death of “the theme of European imperialism” across the
developing world during this period: Chakrabarty, “Legacies of Bandung,” 58.
182. Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees, 78.
183. El-Shawan, “Western Music and Its Practitioners,” 151.
184. See ibid., 149, 151.
185. MfAA B 1329/76, “Information zu einigen neuen Aspekten der Kulturpolitik der
Arabischen Republik Ägypten,” February 19, 1974, 3: “Es ist zu erwarten, daß sich die Arbeits-
bedingungen in der Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium für Kultur weiter verschlechtern.”
186. See Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, 284–85.
187. Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 215.
188. See ibid., 214–15.
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power that “[w]hen a country’s culture includes universal values and its pol-
icies promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability
of obtaining its desired outcomes.”189 While this statement is problematic in
its assumption that universal values actually exist, it is nevertheless useful for
considering how music diplomacy functioned in such a way as to create syner-
gies between the countries at the center of this article. The functions and val-
ues that the GDR, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon ascribed to Western art music
were often quite distinct. All four countries were united, however, by the fact
that their ruling elites esteemed this cultural tradition. It thus served as some-
thing of a common space in which the GDR could present itself as a viable
partner and develop political allegiances.
Appendix Programs of concerts given in the Middle East by the Dresdner
Philharmonie, the Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Leipzig, the Deutsche
Staatsoper, and the Gewandhausorchester, 1967 and 1969190
January 1967: Dresdner Philharmonie, Lebanon and Egypt
Heinz Bongartz, conductor; Adele Stolte, soprano; Wolfgang Stephen,
trumpet
Beirut, January 6, and Cairo, January 9:
Weber Overture to Der Freischütz
Haydn Symphony no. 88 (replaced by Strauss’s Don Juan in Cairo)
Kurz Concerto for Trumpet and Strings
Dvořák Symphony no. 8
Cairo, January 8, and Alexandria, January 10:
Strauss Don Juan
Mozart “A questo seno deh vieni—Or che il cielo a me ti rende,” K. 374;
“Bella mia fiamma—Resta, o cara,” K. 528
Bongartz Patria o muerte: Fidel Castro und dem kubanischen Volk in
aufrichtiger Bewunderung
Brahms Symphony no. 1
189. Nye, Soft Power, 11.
190. The programs for the Dresdner Philharmonie concerts have been compiled from
BArch DR 1/18881, vol. 1, “Direktive für das Gastspiel der Dresdner Philharmonie in der VAR
und der Republik Libanon vom 6. bis 13. January 1967,” 1, and Härtwig, “Reise der Dresdner
Philharmonie.” Details of the concerts given by the Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Leipzig are
provided in MfAA B 1003/69, Kurt Walter, “Bericht über eine Dienstreise in den Libanon,”
2, 4, 10, 11. The Deutsche Staatsoper’s programs can be found in BArch DR 1/18881, vol.
3, Ernst Zielke, “Direktive zur Durchführung des Gastspiels der Kammeroper der Deutschen
Staatsoper Berlin vom 1. bis 13. März 1969 in Kairo,” January 31, 1969, 2–3. Details of the
concerts performed by the Gewandhausorchester at the Baalbeck Festival have been drawn from
the festival program book: Quatorzième festival international de Baalbeck, 134–35.
534 Journal of the American Musicological Society
Cairo, January 12:
Beethoven Egmont Overture
Beethoven Symphony no. 2
Beethoven Symphony no. 5
Encores:
Wagner Overture to Tannhäuser (Beirut, January 6)
Wagner Overture to Rienzi (Cairo, January 9)
Weber Overture to Oberon (Cairo, January 12)
August 1967: Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Leipzig, Lebanon, Syria,
and Egypt
Herbert Kegel, conductor; Nejmi Succari, violin (Baalbeck and Damascus);
Samson François, piano (Baalbeck); Dieter Zechlin, piano (Cairo)
Baalbeck Festival, August 17, and Damascus, August 20:
Wagner Prelude to Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg
Brahms Violin Concerto
Shostakovich Symphony no. 1
Baalbeck Festival, August 19:
Beethoven Overture to Fidelio
Fuleihan Baalbeck Overture (premiere)
Prokofiev Piano Concerto no. 3
Schumann Symphony no. 4
Cairo, August 22, and Alexandria, August 23:
Wagner Prelude to Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg
Beethoven Piano Concerto no. 5
Shostakovich Symphony no. 1
Cairo, August 26:
Beethoven Overture to Fidelio
Beethoven Piano Concerto no. 3
Beethoven Symphony no. 3 (Eroica)
Encore:
Dvořák Two of the Slavonic Dances (all except Cairo, August 26)
March 1969: Deutsche Staatsoper and Staatskapelle Berlin, Cairo
Operas:
Mozart Così fan tutte (March 3, 4, 6, 7); directed by Erich-Alexander
Winds; conducted by Otmar Suitner
Strauss Ariadne auf Naxos (March 10, 12); directed by Erhard Fischer;
conducted by Joachim Freyer
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Concerts:
1. A Mozart evening (March 5) conducted by Otmar Suitner with Sylvia Geszty
(soprano), Peter Schreier (tenor), and Siegfried Vogel (bass)
Mozart Overture to Le nozze di Figaro
Mozart Sinfonia Concertante for Violin, Viola, and Orchestra in E-flat
Major, K. 364
Mozart “Schöne Donna, dies genaue Register” (Don Giovanni)
Mozart “Vedrò mentr’ io sospiro” (Le nozze di Figaro)
Mozart “Mia speranza adorata,” K. 416
Mozart Serenade no. 13 for Strings in G Major, K. 525 (“Eine kleine
Nachtmusik”)
2. An evening of J. S. Bach and Hanns Eisler (March 9) conducted by Otmar Suitner
with Hans Pischner (harpsichord) and Annelies Burmeister (contralto)
Bach Brandenburg Concerto no. 3
Bach Harpsichord Concerto no. 1 in D Minor, BWV 1052
Eisler Das Vorbild: Triptychon für Altsolo und Orchester nach Worten
von Goethe
Bach Concerto for Two Violins in D Minor, BWV 1043
August 1969: Gewandhausorchester, Lebanon
Kurt Masur, conductor; Mstislav Rostropovich, cello; Sviatoslav Richter,
piano
Baalbeck Festival, August 7:
Reinhold Triptychon für Orchester
Dvořák Cello Concerto
Schumann Symphony no. 1
Baalbeck Festival, August 9:
Beethoven Symphony no. 7
Brahms Piano Concerto no. 2
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Abstract
Music provided the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with a crucial in-
ternational platform during the Cold War. Denied diplomatic recognition by
most Western nations until the early 1970s, the state depended on artists to
negotiate its image abroad and channeled considerable resources to this end.
This article explores how the GDR tried to expedite diplomatic relations with
Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon in the late 1960s through an intensive program of
musical activity, which included attempts to send East German musical
“experts” to Cairo and Damascus, and the organization of state-funded tours
to the region by high-profile ensembles such as the Dresdner Philharmonie, the
Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Leipzig, the Gewandhausorchester Leipzig, and
the Deutsche Staatsoper. Examining variously the politics of cultural transfer
that these activities entailed, the economics involved, and the power dynamics
that played out in the relations between the GDR and Egypt, in particular, the
article illuminates the way music diplomacy functioned between Cold War
periphery states. Notably, cultural exchange between the GDR and the Arab
nations was shaped as much by discourses of postcolonialism, anti-imperialism,
and anti-Zionism as it was by any binary opposition of Marxist-Leninism and
capitalist democracy.
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